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Passive Discrimination:  
When Does It Make Sense to Pay Too Little? 
Jonah Gelbach,† Jonathan Klick,†† & Lesley Wexler‡ 
Economists have long recognized employers’ ability to construct benefits packages 
to induce workers to sort themselves into and out of jobs. For instance, to encourage appli-
cations from individuals with a highly valued but largely unobservable characteristic, such 
as patience, employers might offer benefits that patient individuals are likely to value more 
than other individuals. By offering a compensation package with highly valued benefits 
but a relatively low wage, employers will attract workers with the favored characteristic 
and discourage other individuals from applying for or accepting the job. While economic 
theory generally views this kind of self-selection in value neutral terms, prejudiced em-
ployers could exploit this mechanism to systematically discourage individuals on the basis 
of observable characteristics that the law prohibits employers from considering in their 
hiring decisions. As long as groups systematically differ in their preferences for various 
employment terms and conditions, employers can generate sorting in the application and 
employment acceptance stages, leading to the desired segregated outcome in a way that 
regulators will find difficult to prevent without dictating uniformity in benefits packages.  
We develop a formal model as well as an intuitive discussion of this phenomenon. 
We provide a number of representative illustrations of how a prejudiced employer could 
exploit preference heterogeneity for discriminatory ends. These mechanisms include wage 
and benefit packages such as (1) high pension, low wages; (2) commission-based salaries; 
(3) Sundays-off policies; and (4) free school tuition. We also note that some employers 
might end up with a segregated workforce even when they have no intention to sort 
workers or when they intend to sort for a nondiscriminatory characteristic.  
Finally, we conclude that current federal antidiscrimination law inadequately ad-
dresses either intentional or unintentional passive discrimination. Neither disparate 
treatment nor disparate impact frameworks are well suited to grappling with this form 
of structural discrimination. Passive discrimination facilitates rather than impedes em-
ployee choice and thus might not be viewed as discrimination per se, even if it results in 
workplace segregation or means that individuals with protected characteristics who fail 
to self sort are least likely to value the form of compensation and fringe benefits they 
receive. We finish with a discussion of some judicial and legislative approaches that may 
ameliorate passive discrimination. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Since the seminal contributions of Gary Becker,1 scholars have 
generated a huge theoretical and empirical law and economics litera-
ture around the topic of employment discrimination.2 In that litera-
ture, scholars examine discrimination based on race,3 sex,4 religion,5 
and a host of other characteristics.6 Further, researchers develop and 
investigate models in which discrimination springs from employer,7 
coworker,8 and customer9 animus, as well as discrimination that is not 
generated by animus at all, but through a type of Bayesian inference 
referred to as statistical or rational discrimination.10 
These models and empirical investigations center on the employ-
ment policies and practices known in the legal context as the disparate 
                                                                                                                           
 1 Gary Becker, The Economics of Discrimination 122 (Chicago 1957) (developing a frame-
work for analyzing workplace discrimination in such a manner that yields quantifiable data and 
the opportunity for empirical research). 
 2 For a review of this literature, see John J. Donohue, The Law and Economics of Antidiscrimi-
nation Law, in A.M. Polinsky and Steven Shavell, eds, 2 Handbook of Law and Economics 1387–1467 
(North-Holland 2007).  
 3 See, for example, John J. Donohue and James J. Heckman, Continuous versus Episodic 
Change: The Impact of Civil Rights Policy on the Economic Status of Blacks, 29 J Econ Lit 1603, 
1640 (1991) (evaluating several theories for the economic progress of blacks after 1964). 
 4 See, for example, Richard A. Posner, An Economic Analysis of Sex Discrimination Laws, 
56 U Chi L Rev 1311, 1334 (1989) (suggesting that sex discrimination laws may have reduced 
women’s aggregate welfare); John J. Donohue, Prohibiting Sex Discrimination in the Workplace: 
An Economic Perspective, 56 U Chi L Rev 1337, 1366 (1989) (arguing that sex discrimination 
laws can improve workplace efficiency and are necessary to change employer behavior).  
 5 See, for example, Vani K. Borooah, Is There a Penalty to Being a Catholic in Northern 
Ireland: An Econometric Analysis of the Relationship between Religious Belief and Occupational 
Success, 15 Eur J Pol Econ 163, 188 (1999) (suggesting that the overrepresentation of Catholics 
in the jobless population reflects systematic religious discrimination). 
 6 See, for example, Christine Jolls, Identifying the Effects of the Americans with Disabilities 
Act Using State-law Variation: Preliminary Evidence on Educational Participation Effects, 94 Am 
Econ Rev 447, 448 (2004) (comparing changes in educational participation by individuals with 
disabilities across states with differing pre-ADA regimes). 
 7 See, for example, Becker, Economics of Discrimination at 31 (cited in note 1) (creating a 
model that accounts for employers’ tastes and market forces in order to measure employer discrim-
ination against employees); Dan A. Black, Discrimination in an Equilibrium Search Model, 13 J 
Labor Econ 309, 327 (1995) (predicting that minority workers as a group will receive lower 
wages if any fraction of employers harbors distaste for that group).  
 8 See, for example, Barry R. Chiswick, Racial Discrimination in the Labor Market: A Test 
of Alternate Hypotheses, 81 J Polit Econ 1330, 1346 (1973) (presenting evidence that race-based 
preferences for coworkers lead to income inequality).  
 9 See, for example, George J. Borjas and Steven G. Bronars, Consumer Discrimination and 
Self-employment, 97 J Polit Econ 581, 604 (1989) (arguing that white consumers’ discriminatory 
preferences lead to lower incomes for self-employed minorities). 
 10 See, for example, Edmund S. Phelps, The Statistical Theory of Racism and Sexism, 62 Am 
Econ Rev 659, 661 (1972) (postulating that background assumptions about minority employees’ 
capabilities influence the interpretation of objective performance metrics). 
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treatment of or the disparate impact on individuals in protected classes.11 
Regulators and courts tend to frame their inquiries around whether an 
employer directly and intentionally treats employees from a disfavored 
group differently or whether the employer imposes job requirements 
that are unnecessary for the performance of the job but have the effect, 
intended or not, of disadvantaging individuals in a disfavored group.12  
In this Article, we present a distinct mechanism of employer dis-
crimination largely ignored by scholars and regulators alike. What we 
term “passive discrimination” involves the employer’s use of wage and 
benefits packages that exploit observed, systematic group-level prefe-
rence heterogeneity to induce workers to sort themselves ex ante such 
that members of a disfavored group view the job opportunity as being 
less attractive than do members of other groups.  
By way of illustration, imagine a setting in which individuals from 
two groups, Deltas and Omegas, comprise the labor pool from which em-
ployees may be hired. While the work productivity of Deltas and Omegas 
is drawn from the same distribution (that is, the expected productivity of 
members from each group is equal), a given employer dislikes Omegas 
for reasons unrelated to their job qualifications. Because Omegas have 
suffered discrimination historically, legislation designates Omegas as a 
protected class for employment purposes. Further, while both Deltas and 
Omegas have similar reservation wages,13 Deltas, on average, more highly 
value some nontransferable good that the employer can procure (or 
produce) at a cost equal to or lower than the Deltas’ average valuation 
of the good. To make the illustration more concrete, assume the em-
ployer is a brewery and offers free beer at lunchtime. 
While the employer prefers to hire only Deltas, regulators and 
courts could easily observe such behavior and impose legal penalties as 
well as order the employer to hire Omegas. Because Deltas and Ome-
gas, by assumption, possess equal abilities in terms of job requirements, 
the employer cannot justify differential hiring decisions based on the 
claim that Omegas fail to meet a relevant job requirement. Lastly, if the 
employer attempts to conceal the job’s availability from Omegas by 
advertising it only in Delta neighborhoods or through Delta social net-
works, regulators are likely to discover such a plan and may require the 
employer to advertise more broadly. 
                                                                                                                           
 11 See John J. Donohue, Foundations of Employment Discrimination Law 193 (Foundation 
2003). 
 12 See, for example, Griggs v Duke Power Co, 401 US 424, 432 (1970) (“Congress directed 
the thrust of [Title VII] to the consequences of employment discrimination, not simply the moti-
vation.”); EEOC Compliance Manual § 604.1 at 2093 (CCH 1999). 
 13 Reservation wages are the lowest wage at which an individual is willing to accept a job. 
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In our setting, employers may advertise the job broadly and make 
hiring decisions in a seemingly nondiscriminatory fashion, avoiding law-
suits and penalties from the regulator, and still achieve an ultimate work-
force that is predominantly (if not exclusively) composed of Deltas. 
Specifically, if the employer offers a compensation package composed 
of a submarket wage as well as access to the free beer at lunchtime, 
Omegas will find such a job unattractive as they do not value the beer 
enough to compensate them for the lower wage, while Deltas will still 
gladly accept the job offers. If the employment regulators note the ab-
sence of Omegas in the firm’s employment, the brewery can easily pro-
duce documentation that it advertised broadly, generated an applicant 
pool that approximates the relevant labor pool, and offered em-
ployment to both Deltas and Omegas at a nondiscriminatory rate. 
Ultimately, according to the firm, due to no misconduct on its part, 
Omegas simply lacked interest in working for the brewery. By engaging 
in passive discrimination of this sort, the employer avoids hiring indi-
viduals from the disfavored group without generating regulatory back-
lash or successful civil litigation. 
While scholars who write in the area of discrimination law have 
tangentially touched on this phenomenon in some isolated contexts, 
such as discussions of workplace dress codes14 or the disproportionate 
burden placed on women by jobs requiring extensive travel,15 no one 
has examined these practices in a systematic way.16 Such discrimination 
is not generally presented as an avenue for intentional discrimination, 
but rather as an ancillary effect of employment policies or conditions. 
When looking at these practices, scholars tend to suggest that either 
employment discrimination law should be readjusted to better grapple 
with structural and nonintentional work conditions,17 or such practices, 
                                                                                                                           
 14 See, for example, Katharine T. Bartlett, Only Girls Wear Barrettes: Dress and Appearance 
Standards, Community Norms, and Workplace Equality, 92 Mich L Rev 2541, 2544 (1994) (ar-
guing that judicial reliance on community norms of workplace dress and appearance legitimates 
the gender stereotypes that Title VII was enacted to eliminate).  
 15 See, for example, Laura T. Kessler, The Attachment Gap: Employment Discrimination 
Law, Women’s Cultural Caregiving, and the Limits of Economic and Liberal Legal Theory, 34 
Mich J L Ref 371, 413–14 (2001). 
 16 Many have discussed practices that implicate the work-life balance, which may operate 
to screen out many women from particular jobs. We consider strategies such as the use of long 
hours and high wages, or substantial face time and high wages, to be special cases, as they more 
directly implicate productivity than the hypotheticals we present. As we explain in Part I, for 
purposes of disproving Gary Becker’s theory, we presume all workers are equally productive. 
Cases that integrate productivity are important and doctrinally interesting, but we focus on the 
simplest examples in this Article and leave more complex cases for later works. 
 17 See, for example, Tristin K. Green, Discrimination in Workplace Dynamics: Toward a Struc-
tural Account of Disparate Treatment Theory, 38 Harv CR–CL L Rev 91, 105 (2003) (arguing that 
reorganization of the workplace into a less hierarchical model has allowed discriminatory bias to 
enter in such a manner that current Title VII doctrine would not remedy). 
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while lamentable, are potentially justified on nondiscriminatory 
grounds.18 Yet recent class actions suggest that much of legal academia 
and the public underestimate the prevalence of basic animus- or stereo-
type-driven discrimination.19 So it should be unsurprising if litigation-
savvy employers might deliberately craft compensation structures and 
packages to exclude certain types of workers. 
Lior Strahilevitz’s work on using neighborhood amenities to in-
duce segregation in housing communities is a notable exception to the 
scholarly blinders to the possible relationship between self-sorting and 
deliberately induced segregation.20 The intuition motivating his work is 
similar to the one we exploit here. Strahilevitz argues that because anti-
discrimination laws prohibit developers from directly marketing new 
neighborhoods to buyers from favored demographic groups,21 develop-
ers instead “embed” costly amenities such as golf courses that tend to 
be little valued by potential residents from disfavored demographic 
groups. By requiring all residents to pay for these amenities, members 
of the disfavored group will generally choose not to live in such com-
munities. Because of this likely choice, individuals from favored groups 
can then treat the existence of these “exclusionary amenities” as both a 
signal of the neighborhood’s demographic make-up and an implicit 
commitment that the community will maintain that make-up. These 
amenities essentially enable the developer to segregate the community 
by inducing the individuals from undesirable groups to self-select away 
from the community without running afoul of fair housing laws or other 
local regulations that prohibit discrimination.22 By exploiting observable 
group-level preference heterogeneity, the developers can passively 
achieve segregation whereas they would be punished if they overtly 
attempted to discriminate to achieve the same ends. 
In this Article, we begin by presenting a formal model of passive 
discrimination in which an employer offers a compensation package 
composed of a below-market cash wage plus some nontransferable 
benefit that is valued less highly by individuals from the disfavored 
group. The formal model highlights the conditions under which a sepa-
                                                                                                                           
 18 See, for example, Richard A. Epstein, Forbidden Grounds: The Case against Employment 
Discrimination Laws 290–312 (Harvard 1995). 
 19 Michael Selmi, Sex Discrimination in the Nineties, Seventies Style: Case Studies in the 
Preservation of Male Workplace Norms, 9 Emp Rts & Emp Policy J 1, 30–32 (2005) (contrasting 
the rise of major class action sex discrimination cases against the dominant perception that 
workplace sex discrimination has largely receded over the last thirty years).  
 20 See generally Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, Exclusionary Amenities in Residential Communi-
ties, 92 Va L Rev 437 (2006). 
 21 The law also limits the extent to which developers can provide information regarding 
the demographic makeup of the existing residential population. See id at 444 n 18. 
 22 Id at 437. 
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rating or segregating equilibrium will be achieved.23 It also shows, 
however, that in the resulting equilibrium, individuals from the disfa-
vored group need not be “harmed” in terms of ultimate economic well-
being.24 Therefore, this sort of equilibrium is not generally subject to 
Becker’s conclusion that competition will force out employer taste-
based discrimination in the labor market. We then provide some real-
world illustrations of group-level preference heterogeneity that could 
generate passive discrimination in various occupational settings. We 
also note examples where the exploitation of preference heterogenei-
ty may generate normatively attractive worker sorting.  
We next discuss when current antidiscrimination law applies to 
this kind of passive discrimination. We note that some employers hold 
a discriminatory intent when designing such terms and conditions, 
while others might be simply unaware or neutral as to when their de-
sign of such packages will induce segregation based on membership in 
a disfavored group. Part III notes doctrinal limits in the context of 
compensation packages as well as how the passive discrimination set-
ting might magnify some of Title VII’s more general limitations. We 
conclude with a discussion of how regulators and courts might address 
passive discrimination. 
I.  A FORMAL MODEL OF PASSIVE DISCRIMINATION 
In this Part, we present a very basic, one-period microeconomic 
model in which equilibrium occurs in both perfectly competitive labor 
and goods markets. Because all hypothesized workers are equally 
productive, and because no market power exists and no state mandate 
                                                                                                                           
 23 For those unconvinced in the first instance that competition will force out employer 
taste-based discrimination or for those interested in relaxing some of the assumptions of perfect 
competition, such passive discrimination presents a different harm. If an employer attempts to 
create a segregating equilibrium and does not entirely succeed, the employees he attempted but 
failed to screen out may experience economic harm vis-à-vis other employees. Many, though not 
necessarily all, individuals within the disfavored group will receive a compensation package that 
is of less perceived or actual value to them than to the other employees.  
 24 Individuals from the disfavored groups who self-sort out of the job, as well as those from 
the favored groups who self-sort into the job, do, however, experience many harms associated 
with segregation itself. This harm is less straightforward than the harms associated with residen-
tial segregation, such as the exclusion from valuable social networks. But integrated workplaces 
may provide welfare values to all involved by decreasing stigma and eradicating misperceptions 
among groups. In other words, those who participate in an integrated workforce benefit by les-
sening the effects of irrational or incorrect stereotypes.  
In addition, much evidence suggests that those from protected groups, such as women, seek 
integrated and diverse workplaces as a proxy for a nondiscriminatory environment. This point is 
articulated in Scott A. Moss, Women Choosing Diverse Workplaces: A Rational Preference with 
Disturbing Implications for Both Occupational Segregation and Economic Analysis of Law, 27 
Harv Women’s L J 1, 88 (2004). Even workers who economically gain from segregation may have 
a preference for fairness or diversity that is unsatisfied by a segregated equilibrium. 
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supports segregation, models like this one typically cannot sustain a 
deliberately segregated equilibrium. In order to maintain segregation, 
prejudiced firms would have to pay a premium to favored workers to 
be sure of attracting them. However, any firm that did so would have 
higher costs of production than nonprejudiced firms. These higher 
costs would render prejudiced firms uncompetitive, and in a model of 
perfect competition, these firms would necessarily go out of business. 
Thus, employers could not sustain deliberate discrimination against 
disfavored groups in equilibrium. However, when workers’ prefe-
rences for an amenity good are correlated with worker types, segre-
gated equilibria are possible, and possibly even unique. Prejudiced 
firms can use compensation plans that combine cash wages and fringe 
benefits in an effort to hire only the favored types of workers.  
We first discuss some basic background details of the model in 
Part I.A.1, focusing on the production technology, competitive labor 
and goods markets, and the (assumed) systematic differences in prefe-
rences of two worker types: Deltas and Omegas. We then derive the 
optimal consumption bundles of Deltas and Omegas. Deltas consume 
both a generic good and amenities, while Omegas choose to consume 
only the generic good. In Part I.A.2, we then consider the labor mar-
ket equilibrium when all labor market compensation must be paid in 
cash, so that fringe benefits are not allowed. The resulting equilibrium 
is integrated in the sense that no firm can be sure of sustaining a deli-
berately discriminatory hiring-and-compensation policy. 
Finally, in Part I.A.3, we introduce the possibility of compensation 
plans that involve both cash wages and fringe benefits, considering first 
the case where firms face the same amenity price as do their workers. In 
such cases, a no-fringe-benefits equilibrium exists. As above, this equi-
librium is integrated. However, at least one cash-and-fringe compensa-
tion plan25 allows prejudiced firms to hire only Deltas in equilibrium. 
The resulting equilibrium is segregated, in the sense that at least some 
firms may (1) deliberately avoid hiring Omegas, and (2) stay in business. 
Interestingly, the Omegas’ utility is no lower in this equilibrium than it 
would be in the cash-wage-only equilibrium. This result follows because 
of the competitive nature of the labor market, which ensures that oth-
er firms will hire Omegas and pay them their marginal product.26 We 
emphasize this point to highlight how it diverges from standard results 
suggesting that employer taste-based discrimination is not possible in 
equilibrium in competitive markets. While Omegas may suffer no 
                                                                                                                           
 25 Typically, an infinite number of compensation plans exist. 
 26 If workers are bothered by participating in an economy with a segregated workforce, then 
their overall welfare will be reduced in any segregated equilibrium. Where this fact is relevant, we will 
note it. However, the equilibria themselves do not depend on the existence of such a phenomenon. 
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harm in terms of their valuation of their compensation terms, a social 
and/or individual cost to segregation may exist independent of utility 
as measured by the consumption of goods and leisure only.  
We also consider the case where firms have a price advantage in 
purchasing amenities, perhaps because of economies of scale. In this 
case, no integrated equilibrium exists. Any equilibrium necessarily in-
volves cash-and-fringe compensation plans used to pay Deltas and a 
cash-only plan used to pay Omegas. Banning fringe benefits would 
(1) eliminate segregation, (2) reduce Deltas’ utility compared to the 
segregated equilibrium, and (3) have no impact on the Omegas’ utility 
compared to the segregated equilibrium. We note that this condition for 
equilibrium would hold even when employers harbor no animus toward 
Omegas. These results occur because forcing firms to use only cash 
wages prevents Deltas from negotiating discounted amenities without 
providing any countervailing benefit to Omegas. As above, though, if 
discrimination is regarded as socially or individually harmful in ways 
that do not show up in consumption-based utility, then Omegas, as well 
as Deltas, may well be worse off under a segregated equilibrium. 
A. Model Details 
Suppose two types of workers, Deltas (signified by ) and Ome-
gas (signified by ) exist. Every member of each group is identical to 
all other members of that group in terms of tastes. Preferences for 
Deltas and Omegas are given by  
 U = x
b1- – c × W (1) 
 U = x – c × W, (2) 
where x is the number of units of a generic consumption good a per-
son consumes, b is the number of units of an amenity good (mnemoni-
cally, think of this good as “beer”), c is the disutility of working, W 
equals one if the person works for pay and zero otherwise, and  is a 
preference parameter for Deltas and lies between zero and one.27  
We assume that all jobs in the economy involve the same type of 
labor, all workers have one unit of labor to offer, and all workers are 
equally productive. Firms can hire as many workers as they like. If 
                                                                                                                           
 27 The function f(x, b) = xb1- is an example of a type of preferences known as Cobb-
Douglas. This form is standard to assume for preferences, because it leads to the result that the 
consumer spends the fraction  of her income on good x and the rest on good b. See Andreu 
Mas-Colell, Michael D. Whinston, and Jerry R. Green, Microeconomic Theory 55 (Oxford 1995) 
(explaining the use of the Cobb-Douglas utility function in deriving a consumer’s optimal con-
sumption bundle of commodities). Nothing important about our results hinges on assuming this 
type of preferences; we do so for expositional ease. 
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hired by a firm, each worker can produce Q units of the generic good 
with her one unit of labor. We normalize the price of a unit of the ge-
neric consumption good to be one,28 and we assume that the price of 
the amenity good is fixed at level pb. 
1. Optimal consumption and labor supply decisions. 
Let Y be the income a Delta worker receives if she works for pay; 
assuming for simplicity that she has zero income otherwise, her income 
equals W × Y. Her utility-maximizing choice of consumption in terms 
of x and b will then be given by whatever choice of (x, b) maximizes 
U subject to the constraint that  
 x + pb × b = W × Y. (3) 
Equation (3) is known as the budget constraint—in this case for 
Deltas. Each unit of x costs one unit of income, and each unit of b 
costs pb, so altogether the Delta’s total expenditure is x plus the prod-
uct of pb times b. In our static, one-period model, individuals lack a rea-
son to save any income, and thus people will want to spend all their in-
come. Similarly, individuals lack an opportunity to borrow, so people’s 
spending will be limited to their income.29 Thus, Equation (3) is the 
budget constraint for a Delta.  
The form of preferences we have assumed for Deltas implies that 
their optimal consumption choice is to spend the fraction  of income 
on the generic consumption good and the remainder on the amenity. 
Thus, optimal consumption levels for a Delta are given by 
        x* =  × Y and  b* = (1 – ) × Y / pb  (4) 
if she works for pay, and zero otherwise.30 If the Delta works, then her 
utility will be 
                                                                                                                           
 28 In an equilibrium model like this one, we lose no generality in making such a normaliza-
tion because only relative prices matter. As a result, we simply choose to measure the currency in 
convenient units. 
 29 Abstracting from saving does not limit this model’s applicability to the case of pension 
plans. In such cases, we could simply reinterpret the model so that b is retirement income, in 
which case pb reflects the interest rate at which saving is possible and Y is the present value of a 
Delta’s lifetime income. The assumption that Omegas get no utility from retirement income is 
then equivalent to assuming that they do not live to retirement. Obviously, this assumption is 
extreme, but the only important point is that Omegas’ life expectancy is shorter; we could easily 
generalize the model to allow Omegas to care about retirement positively but less than Deltas, 
due to shorter life expectancy. 
 30 To see why Equation (4) holds, first consider optimal consumption on the generic good. 
The Delta spends the fraction  of her income Y on this good, and each unit of x costs one 
dollar, since the price of x is one by assumption. Thus, she will buy  × Y units of this good. She 
will spend the remainder of her income, (1 – ) × Y, on the amenity good. Its price is pb, so we 
must have pb × b* = (1 – ) × Y, and dividing by pb yields the expression in the text. 
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 U,work = [
(1 – )1-pb
-1] × Y – c (5) 
 = v(pb) × Y – c, (6) 
where the first term on the right-hand side of (5) is the result of plug-
ging in the optimal consumption levels in (4) to the utility function in 
(1). The function v(pb) collects the part of U,work that varies with the 
preference parameter and the amenity price. The important thing to 
notice is that this function, and thus the highest possible value of utility, 
U,work, is a decreasing function of the amenity price.  
The above assumptions imply that if a Delta forgoes work, then 
her utility will be zero.31 Thus, she will work for pay if and only if the 
right-hand side of (6) is non-negative. In other words, inducing Deltas 
to work requires that firms pay them at least enough income, Y, to 
allow them to realize c units of consumption utility. 
Next, consider the simpler case of Omegas. Let Y be an Omega’s 
income if she works for pay, and again assume zero income for non-
workers. Omegas have very simple consumption plans based on (2): they 
consume all their income by purchasing the generic good and spend 
nothing on the amenity good. Since each unit of the generic good costs 
one unit of income, this means that Omegas will consume Y units of 
the generic good. Utility for working Omegas is thus 
 U,work = Y – c. (7) 
As with Deltas, Omegas will work if and only if this utility level is at 
least zero, since that is their utility if they do not work. Thus, an Omega 
worker will be willing to work if and only if she is paid at least Y.  
2. Labor market equilibrium without fringe benefits.  
We are interested in equilibria in which both Deltas and Omegas 
are employed. A firm will be willing to employ a worker if the revenue 
the firm gets by selling the worker’s output is at least as great as the 
cost of employing the worker.32 Since the price of the generic good is 
one dollar and each worker produces Q units if hired, each firm’s rev-
enue will be Q dollars times the number of workers it hires. Its cost 
will be Y if it employs a Delta and Y if it employs an Omega.  
We will assume perfectly competitive goods and labor markets. We 
do so because (1) finding discriminatory equilibria in models without 
perfect competition is easy, and (2) finding them in models with perfect 
                                                                                                                           
 31 This is another normalization: it does not affect any result but simply involves choosing a 
convenient basis for measurement. 
 32 We assume away all other costs for exposition; again, this assumption is not essential. 
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competition is difficult.33 Since all workers in the model are equally pro-
ductive, incomes will be equalized across workers in any perfectly com-
petitive equilibrium in which workers are paid in cash only (that is, in 
which no fringe benefits exist). Since we assume all workers are equally 
productive, if some workers were paid less than others, firms would 
compete for the lower-paid workers, bidding up their wages until all 
incomes were equal, contradicting the premise of unequal pay. Thus, in 
this simple model, we have the result that Y = Y = Y.  
Moreover, this amount of income will exactly equal Q, the reve-
nue that firms realize by producing goods. This is true because (1) any 
firm paying more than Q dollars to its worker will lose money and go 
out of business, and (2) any firm paying less than Q will find its work-
er’s wage bid up by other firms seeking to hire the worker away for a 
wage between the incumbent’s wage and the level Q. Thus, only Q is a 
feasible equilibrium wage. Since Equation (7) tells us that Omegas’ 
utility when they work is Y – c, and since Y = Q, Omegas will work if 
and only if Q  c. Similarly, Equation (6) shows that Deltas will work 
if and only if v(pb) × Q  c. To focus on the only interesting case, when 
both types of workers work in equilibrium, we assume that Q is at 
least as great as c or c / v(pb), whichever is greater; again we expe-
rience no loss of generality here.34 
If all firms simply offered the wage Q to workers, then no reason 
exists to think Deltas were more likely than Omegas to work at any 
given firm. In fact, the only mechanism for a firm to attract only Deltas 
would be to pay them a higher wage than other firms. But in a perfectly 
competitive equilibrium, we have argued that this wage strategy is im-
possible as these firms would go bankrupt. Of course, in such an econ-
omy, prejudiced firms could refuse to hire Omegas. However, such firms 
cannot be sure that they would be able to find any Deltas to hire. 
Should Deltas all happen to work at other firms, a prejudiced firm 
would not be able to hire the Delta away without paying an above-
market wage, and doing so would bankrupt the firm. Meanwhile, in the 
absence of antidiscrimination laws, no guarantee exists that in equili-
brium, an Omega will be able to work for a particular prejudiced firm. 
But it will necessarily be true that each Omega will be able to work 
for some firm, at the same wage as is paid to Deltas who work for any 
                                                                                                                           
 33 See Becker, Economics of Discrimination at 36 (cited in note 1) (explaining that in a 
perfectly competitive labor market, firms that discriminate always face larger costs than firms 
that do not). 
 34 These assumptions simply require that both types of worker are productive enough that 
working is not a waste of their time.  
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firm.35 For this reason, many scholars believe that competition drives 
out taste-based discrimination.36 
3. Labor market equilibrium with fringe benefits.  
Now we allow for firms to pay both fringe benefits and cash wag-
es. Firms will provide compensation by giving fringe-receiving workers 
some number of units of the amenity good. We assume that workers 
cannot resell these fringe benefits.37 Since Omegas place no value on 
the amenity good, intuition suggests that employers should be able to 
design a combination of wages and amenities compensation that will 
(1) attract Deltas and (2) repel Omegas. This intuition is correct, as we 
now show. However, some additional surprising results occur as well. 
a) Firms face amenity price pb.  Consider a firm that wishes to hire 
only Deltas. Suppose this firm offers a cash wage amount, Yf, less than 
the labor disutility, c, together with some positive number, bf , of units of 
the amenity good. We refer to this compensation plan as F = (Yf , bf). 
Omegas place no value on the amenity goods, and we have assumed 
away the possibility of resale. Therefore, the value of this compensation 
to an Omega is simply the Yf units of the generic good that the Omega 
can purchase with the cash wage. Since Yf < c by assumption, an Omega 
would rather have zero income than work for this compensation plan.  
Will compensation plan F attract Deltas? Suppose that bf  b* from 
Equation (4). This will cost the firm pb × b* = (1 – ) × Q. Suppose the 
firm combines this fringe-benefit level with the cash wage Yf =  × Q. 
This compensation plan costs the firm exactly Q dollars, which is the 
break-even worker cost that allows firms to produce in competitive 
equilibrium, as explained above. Thus, this compensation plan is feasi-
ble from the firm’s point of view. The compensation plan also allows a 
                                                                                                                           
 35 If discrimination is per se harmful, rather than harmful only in its impact on workers’ 
consumption opportunities, then of course the equilibrium level of well-being would be different 
with antidiscrimination laws. We could account for such a harm by subtracting a term from the 
utility level U in Equation (1), and possibly also for U in Equation (2); this utility reduction 
would occur for a worker only when the workforce is segregated. Importantly, the reduction 
would not affect the way in which either worker is willing to substitute consumption of x for 
consumption of b, or the work/no-work decision. For this reason, accounting for such harm in 
this way affects conclusions about workers’ welfare in equilibrium but not about the allocation 
of resources. But consumption levels themselves cannot be affected by discriminatory prefe-
rences of firms in a cash-only equilibrium like this one. 
 36 The classic exception occurs when consumers possess a taste for discrimination. In such 
cases, firms that treat workers symmetrically may lose business. Hence, civil rights laws would 
have been necessary to eradicate taste-based discrimination in, for example, the Jim Crow states 
(1) even after the elimination of state mandates of discrimination and (2) even if all markets 
were perfectly competitive, provided that (3) sufficiently many consumers were prejudiced.  
 37 This assumption is stronger than necessary. We just need the cost of resale to be suffi-
ciently positive (in other words, transaction costs are nonzero). 
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Delta to attain exactly the consumption bundle she would have cho-
sen for herself had she been paid Q dollars in cash and nothing in 
fringe benefits. Since we assumed previously that  and the amenity 
price pb were such that Deltas would choose to work when offered the 
wage Q, they will also choose to work when offered the compensation 
plan F just described.  
We conclude that there exists a segregated equilibrium in which 
some firms—those that screen out Omegas, which we call screening 
firms—offer compensation plan F only, and other firms offer a cash 
wage of Q together with no fringe benefits. In this equilibrium: (1) only 
Deltas work for the screening firms, (2) Omegas work only for cash-
only firms, and (3) some Deltas may work for cash-only firms.38 We can 
also show that when Deltas strictly prefer to work when offered a no-
fringe wage of Q, firms can design a variety of compensation plans 
that generate segregated equilibria with fringe benefits.39 It can be 
shown that all equilibria require that the cost of a screening firm’s 
compensation plan equal Q. Any firm that pays less than that will face 
competition for its workers, as before. Finally, we note that when no 
prejudiced firm owners exist, the equilibrium from the prior Part is 
also an equilibrium here. We have thus shown that when firms face the 
same amenity price as consumers, they can design a compensation 
plan that both repels Omegas and attracts Deltas, and allows the firm 
to stay in business in competitive equilibrium. 
b) Firms face amenity price pbf < pb.  Next, we consider the case 
when firms have a price advantage relative to consumers in purchas-
ing the amenity, so that pbf < pb. An example is group purchase of in-
surance plans, but many other examples exist. In equilibrium, this 
price advantage means that Deltas must always be paid a compensa-
tion plan that involves fringe benefits. The reason is simple: any firm 
                                                                                                                           
 38 For simplicity, we assume that neither type of worker is unemployed in equilibrium; free 
entry by firms is sufficient for this result. For similar reasons, we assume (1) that there are fewer 
prejudiced firms than there are Deltas or (2) that prejudiced firm owners would prefer to operate 
with an Omega than to go out of business. Assumption (1) ensures that in segregated equilibria, all 
prejudiced employers hire only Deltas. Assumption (2) ensures that Omegas will be employed in a 
segregated equilibrium even if Deltas are rationed in such an equilibrium. It would be straightfor-
ward to derive assumption (1) as a result of a slightly more general model that required capital for 
production, with capital having positive opportunity cost. In such a model, prejudiced employers 
who are unable to hire Deltas would exit the industry, choosing to do something else with their 
costly capital. Since the return on capital in this industry would rise, other, nonprejudiced capital 
owners would then enter, and these employers would be willing to hire Omegas. This entry would 
continue until the industry had no more unemployed Omegas, at which point we would have an 
equilibrium like the one described in the text. These sorts of assumptions and arguments are 
conventional in the study of how perfect competition interacts with taste-based preferences. 
 39 In each of these equilibria, screening firms offer a fringe level bf that is more than zero 
but less than b*, with the cash wage then equaling Q minus pb × bf . 
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that pays a Delta only in cash is providing less than the maximum 
possible benefit that can be provided at that cost. Another firm could 
offer to pay the Delta slightly less in cash together with some fringe 
benefits. Because firms acquire the fringe benefits more cheaply than 
Deltas, the second firm could provide greater utility to the Delta than 
the first, while paying less to do so. The Delta would switch jobs and 
the second firm would earn a greater profit than the first. Thus, no 
competitive equilibrium exists in which any Delta is paid only in cash. 
In fact, firms’ advantage in purchasing the amenity means that 
Deltas will want their employers to purchase all units of the amenity 
that the Deltas consume. As in the models above, equilibrium requires 
that firms pay Q for each worker, whether Delta or Omega; if a firm 
paid less than that, our familiar compensation-competition story would 
apply. Thus, Deltas will be paid a cash-and-fringe compensation plan 
that costs Q dollars, while Omegas will once again be paid Q dollars in 
cash. To find the utility level for Deltas in equilibrium, we need only 
act as if the Deltas themselves faced the firms’ amenity price, pbf, ra-
ther than the higher price of pb. Thus, we simply plug pbf into Equation 
(6) above, yielding 
            U,f = v(pbf) × Q – c. (8)  
Now, it is easy to show that when pbf < pb, it must be true that  
 v(pbf) > v(pb), (9) 
and this implies that  
 U,f > U,cash only = v(pb) × Q – c. (10) 
We have thus shown that when firms have an amenity price ad-
vantage relative to consumers, Deltas’ utility is strictly greater in the 
with-fringe equilibrium than it would be if regulators banned fringe 
benefits. This equilibrium, which is unique under the argument above, 
is segregated. However, since Omegas continue to receive cash com-
pensation in the amount of Q dollars, their equilibrium utility is unaf-
fected by the existence of fringe compensation: banning fringe com-
pensation plans would not increase Omegas’ utility. A fringe ban in 
the presence of an amenity price advantage on the part of firms would 
simply cause deadweight loss by forcing Deltas to purchase amenities 
at an unnecessarily high price, while giving nothing extra to Omegas. 
Notice that if firms must provide only one compensation plan, workers 
will be segregated in equilibrium even if no employers harbor animus 
toward Omegas: the fact that employers have a cost advantage in pro-
viding the amenity, while worker type is perfectly correlated with 
amenity preference, ensures full separation of workers. If firms can 
offer compensation menus, however, then unprejudiced employers can 
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avoid segregation by offering workers their choice of plan F or all-
cash compensation of Q dollars. 
B. Summary and Discussion of Extensions 
In Part I.A.3.a, we considered the case in which firms must pay 
the same price per unit of the amenity as workers. In Part I.A.3.b, we 
assumed that firms face a lower cost, perhaps because of economies of 
scale. We defined a segregated equilibrium as one in which a preju-
diced employer can guarantee that she will be able to hire a Delta.40  
We showed that segregated equilibria exist in both cases. When 
firms possess no cost advantages for amenities, multiple equilibria exist, 
including a nonsegregated one in which employers pay every worker 
in wages only. When firms possess an amenity cost advantage and 
cannot offer workers a choice between compensation plans, a unique 
equilibrium exists, and it is segregated. Interestingly, Omegas are just as 
economically well-off in terms of consumption-based utility in this equi-
librium as they would be in the equilibrium discussed in Part I.A.3. In 
other words, they would not benefit economically from eliminating 
fringe-induced segregation. However, Deltas are strictly better off in 
the segregated equilibrium than in the no-fringe equilibrium when 
firms have a cost advantage. Hence, banning segregation-inducing 
fringe compensation would (1) eradicate segregation, (2) not improve 
the economic welfare of Omegas, and (3) economically harm Deltas. 
Some firms may possess market power in either the labor or 
product markets, which would allow economically harmful discrimina-
tion to persist. Fringe-generated segregation might be especially troub-
lesome in such market power cases because employers could use it to 
skirt easily monitored disparate treatment proscriptions. Banning fringe 
benefits would still harm Deltas if firms have an amenity price advan-
tage, though with market power, such a ban could also help Omegas. 
Regulators could prevent fringe-based discrimination in this model 
without harming Deltas by mandating that firms offering fringe bene-
fits also offer a cash-only compensation plan whose wage/salary 
equals the cost to the firm of the cash-and-fringe compensation plan.41 
                                                                                                                           
 40 For exposition, we have assumed that firms hire either zero or one workers. However, 
this assumption is not necessary; we could have assumed that firms hire as many workers as they 
can, with the same production technology described above. Firms that hire numerous workers 
using only one type of compensation would then be segregated firms, which is the basis for our 
definition of segregated equilibrium in the text.  
 41 It is important to note that the proper mandate would involve the cost of the cash-and-
fringe compensation plan to the firm, not its value to Deltas. Mandating the latter would have 
the effect of raising the cost of employing Omegas relative to Deltas, even though each type of 
worker is equally productive. 
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Regulators may experience difficulties monitoring such details, though 
how much difficulty will vary with the case.42 
It is, of course, also possible that segregation is undesirable in its 
own right—because integrated workplaces break down stereotypes, 
because individuals incur psychic costs in experiencing discrimination 
even if they voluntarily sort themselves into nondiscriminatory 
workplaces, or because the individuals who do not sort themselves out 
may incur psychic costs in a segregated workplace.43 In such situations, 
reducing the net pecuniary compensation received by Deltas might be 
worthwhile in order to bring about an integrated economy. Dealing 
with either of these extensions would markedly change the welfare 
implications of the segregated result, and we do not discount the re-
levance of either case. However, in terms of consumption utility, se-
gregation induced by fringe compensation does not harm the group 
that is “segregated against,” given perfect competition.  
II.  ILLUSTRATIONS 
In this Part, we first intuitively describe the conditions necessary 
to create the segregated equilibria described above. We then provide 
several practical examples in which employers may adopt some condi-
tions. As implied above, in the case of intentional passive discrimina-
tion, the intuition of the model requires that the employer be able to 
identify a good (or a bundle of goods) that satisfies three conditions: 
(1) the employer knows that the disfavored group values the good on 
average at a lower amount than other groups of potential employees 
place on the good; (2) the good is nontransferable; and (3) the em-
ployer provides the good for a lower cost than the individuals can 
purchase it outsider of the employment relationship. The third condi-
tion generates the most interesting case because when it holds, the 
employer can ensure that it attracts the favored type of employee. 
Each of these conditions merits some discussion. To sort ade-
quately, employers need to identify a good with differential group val-
uation so as to ensure that the “right” kind of employee will be more 
attracted to the job’s benefit than will individuals from the group it 
seeks to discriminate against. Otherwise, if no known systematic valu-
                                                                                                                           
 42 In more general settings, where all types of workers may prefer some degree of amenities, the 
analogous mandate would require offering a menu-style compensation package that allows workers 
to pick among various cash-and-fringe compensation plans whose costs to the firm all are equal. 
 43 See Devah Pager and Hana Shepherd, The Sociology of Discrimination: Racial Discrim-
ination in Employment, Housing, Credit, and Consumer Markets, 34 Ann Rev Sociology 181, 183 
(2008) (suggesting that “those who perceive high levels of discrimination are more likely to 
experience depression, anxiety, and other negative health outcomes”). This phenomenon could 
be modeled as discussed in note 35. 
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ation difference between the groups exists, employers should expect 
any compensation package would draw applicants from the various 
groups of potential employees in proportion to their numbers in the 
labor market at large.44 
Closely related to the first condition, the second condition requires 
that employees cannot simply sell or trade the good from their compen-
sation package. If employees could undertake such a transaction, mem-
bers of the disfavored group could take the job and then, in some sec-
ondary market, sell the good to members of the favored groups. In such 
a scenario, employees from the disfavored group perceive no downside 
from taking the job and then equalizing their cash wages relative to 
other employment opportunities through these sales. Formally, the con-
dition of nontransferability is stronger than necessary.45  
The last condition, that the employer can provide the good more 
cheaply than the worker could purchase it outside of the employment 
context, is not required. When it does not hold, employees from favored 
groups will wind up indifferent between working for the discriminat-
ing employer and receiving mixed cash-and-fringe compensation on the 
one hand, and working for another employer that offers only wages on 
the other. By contrast, when employers can purchase the amenity more 
cheaply than can workers, workers from favored groups will have a 
strict preference for receiving mixed compensation. 
While we have thus far focused our attention on intentional pas-
sive discrimination, the phenomenon could arise as the accidental by-
product of a compensation package designed to achieve other purposes. 
For example, in the illustration offered in the Introduction, a brewery 
whose owners and managers are indifferent regarding employing Deltas 
and Omegas might still want to offer free beer during lunch because it 
believes that doing so promotes corporate loyalty and knowledge of the 
product. In such a case, even if the brewery starts out offering this bene-
fit plus a market wage, Deltas who do not secure positions will offer to 
work for a lower wage given their valuation of the free beer. Eventually, 
this group valuation will lead to a workforce composed of Deltas, to the 
exclusion of Omegas. In fact, this outcome will arise even if the brewery 
operators are originally completely unaware of the differential valua-
tion of the beer between the two groups.46 
                                                                                                                           
 44 This condition is analogous to the now well-known single-crossing condition first dis-
cussed by Michael Spence, Job Market Signaling, 87 Q J of Econ 355 (1973), and J.A. Mirrlees, 
An Exploration in the Theory of Optimum Income Taxation, 38 Rev Econ Stud 175 (1971). 
 45 It is sufficient to require that such secondary market sales entail nontrivial transactions costs. 
 46 In such a situation, the second and third conditions are satisfied. As for the first condi-
tion, the employer acts intending to craft the conditions, but without a discriminatory intent to 
achieve a segregated equilibrium. 
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This outcome implies that, as an analytical matter, the employers’ 
intent is not a necessary element in skewing the firm’s workforce to-
ward a particular group. Compensation packages will draw the group 
that has a relatively high preference for the nonwage component(s) of 
the compensation bundle and repel the group that places a relatively 
low value on the noncash pay. With this in mind, as we provide some 
illustrations of how value heterogeneity might generate segregation 
across firms below, we make no inference regarding the employers’ 
intent in these situations. 
A. Race 
One example of possible discriminatory screening practices re-
lates to subjective discount rates and pay structures that include a de-
ferred compensation component such as a pension. Ample evidence 
demonstrates heterogeneity in subjective discount rates across racial 
groups. To begin with some background, a person’s subjective discount 
rate captures her willingness to delay current consumption for the 
prospect of increased future consumption. All other things equal, 
people prefer current consumption over future consumption, which is 
why virtually no one would view giving her money to a bank for a fixed 
period, say one year, as an attractive option if the bank only promised 
to pay back the same sum at the end of the period.47 Even if the indi-
vidual views the bank as perfectly safe, in the sense that the bank is 
100 percent likely to pay in accordance with its promise, almost no 
individual would choose this option.  
An individual’s subjective discount rate represents how much an 
individual needs to be paid to delay consumption for a single period. 
For example, if an individual requires a total payment of $110 in order to 
turn over her current holding of $100 for the next year,48 the implied 
subjective discount rate for that person is 10 percent per year. While 
everyone exhibits some positive subjective discount rate, individual-to-
individual heterogeneity exists in those subjective discount rates. Thus, 
another person may only require a $5 interest payment (5 percent dis-
count rate) to give up the $100 today, while a third individual may only 
                                                                                                                           
 47 People will sometimes keep their money in a bank account even if it does not pay inter-
est on the money because of the costs associated with storing large amounts of cash, namely the 
risk of theft. Keeping money in the bank may also make other types of transactions more secure 
(for example, mailing a bank check instead of cash). However, even accounting for these bene-
fits, most individuals would be unwilling to make a deposit if subsequent withdrawal were re-
stricted to only take place after a nontrivial time period, unless they were compensated through 
the payment of interest. 
 48 In other words, the individual gives up $100 now and receives the original $100 plus $10 
interest at the end of the one-year period. 
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be willing to undertake the transaction for the promise of receiving $120 
at the end of the year (20 percent discount rate).49 Scholars offer a num-
ber of explanations for this orientation toward favoring current con-
sumption over future consumption. One simple explanation is that indi-
viduals do not know if they will live to consume in the future period.50
Other evolutionary-based explanations have been offered as well.51
While individual-level heterogeneity in subjective discount rates 
is prevalent, labor economists have noted that systematic differences 
in individual discount rates across racial groups may exist as well. In 
other words, while individuals within a given race may exhibit a wide 
range of subjective discount rates, different races, looked at as a group, 
will yield meaningfully different distributions of discount rates. Of 
course, every individual of race Y is unlikely to exhibit a higher dis-
count rate than every individual of race Z, but rather, the average dis-
count rate among individuals of race Y will sometimes diverge from 
the average discount rate among individuals of race Z.52
A natural experiment analyzed by John Warner and Saul Pleeter 
provides some interesting supporting evidence.53 Warner and Pleeter 
examined an instance in which the Department of Defense offered 
two different separation benefit packages to enlisted personnel and 
officers in the US military beginning in 1992. The two options involved 
a lump sum payment and an annuity payment. In discounted present 
value terms, the two options were equivalent for individuals with annual 
subjective discount rates of around 17.5 percent.54 In other words, if one 
calculated what the annuity payments were worth in total at the mo-
ment payments began, a person with a discount rate lower than 17.5 
percent would prefer to take the annuity, while a person with a dis-
count rate higher than that would prefer the lump sum payment. 
                                                                                                                          
49 As a general rule, if the amount the individual gives up now is represented by PV and 
the smallest amount the individual is willing to accept in compensation at the end of n periods is 
represented as FV, then the individual’s subjective discount rate per period is calculated as: 
50 See Zvi Bodie and Robert C. Merton, Finance 49 (Prentice-Hall 2000) (explaining how 
uncertainty about the time of death affects the rate of interest). 
51 For an example, see Partha Dasgupta and Eric Maskin, Uncertainty and Hyperbolic 
Discounting, 95 Am Econ Rev 1290, 1290 (2005) (suggesting that the phenomenon of hyperbolic 
discounting, in which impatience is increased by shorter time horizons, may be the result of 
evolutionary forces shaping preferences in times of uncertainty in order to maximize survival). 
52 Perhaps higher moments (variance, skewness, and so forth) of the distributions differ too. 
53 John T. Warner and Saul Pleeter, The Personal Discount Rate: Evidence from Military 
Downsizing Programs, 91 Am Econ Rev 33 (2001). 
54 Id at 35 table 1. The break-even discount rate varied based on military status. See id. 
( (
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By examining the individual’s decision regarding which benefit to 
take, Warner and Pleeter can infer whether the individual’s subjective 
discount rate is higher or lower than the associated break-even discount 
rate. Because of the detailed data, the researchers examined what effect 
various characteristics had on the benefit decision and thus on the asso-
ciated average subjective discount rate. For our purposes, the most in-
teresting finding to emerge from this study was the large racial hetero-
geneity observed in discount rates. Specifically, conditional on a large 
number of other effects,55 black military enlistees and officers exhibited 
significantly higher subjective discount rates than other minorities and 
whites.56 This result is robust to a number of specification changes, and 
the difference is large, with blacks exhibiting, on average, discount rates 
on the order of five to nine times as great as whites.57 Although this par-
ticular study is limited to military personnel, we have confidence in its 
external validity, as it deals with real and substantial decisions (as op-
posed to experimental tests, which are generally performed over small 
stakes). Further, the main result of interest for our purposes is consis-
tent with what other studies find regarding a higher average subjective 
discount rate for African-Americans in broader datasets.58 
Assuming this empirical regularity holds,59 an employer wishing to 
passively exclude blacks from her workforce could offer a low current 
wage coupled with generous deferred compensation benefits such as a 
                                                                                                                           
 55 The various controls included sex, number of dependents, education level, wage level, 
benefit level, year of decision, age, years of service, geographic region, service branch, IQ score, 
and specialty controls. See id at 43–49.  
 56 Warner and Pleeter, 91 Am Econ Rev at 45 table 4, 47 table 5 (cited in note 53). 
 57 See id. 
 58 For an older study finding this result, see Emily C. Lawrance, Poverty and the Rate of Time 
Preference: Evidence from Panel Data, 99 J Polit Econ 54, 72 (1991) (inferring time preference rates 
from trends in household food consumption). For a more recent study, see generally Melvin Stephens, 
Jr and Erin L. Krupka, Subjective Discount Rates and Household Behavior (Working Paper, Aug 2006), 
online at http://www.andrew.cmu.edu/user/ekrupka/discount_08_30_06.pdf (visited Apr 14, 2009). 
 59 Note that we make no general claim to the validity of the empirical finding except to note the 
high quality of the research papers we cite finding this result. Our primary purpose is one of illustra-
tion. Further, we most certainly do not offer an explanation for why subjective discount rate hetero-
geneity may follow this pattern. A number of logical possibilities present themselves, such as the lower 
lifespan expectation for African-Americans at most points along the age distribution, higher borrow-
ing costs, and lower permanent incomes. See Elizabeth Arias, United States Life Tables, 54 Natl Vital 
Statistics Rep 1, 3 table A (2006), online at http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/nvsr/nvsr54/nvsr54_14.pdf 
(visited Apr 14, 2009) (providing life expectancy by age, race, and sex); John V. Duca and Stuart S. 
Rosenthal, Borrowing Constraints, Household Debt, and Racial Discrimination in Loan Markets, 3 J 
Fin Intermediation 77, 92 (1993) (observing that Federal Reserve data suggests that lenders set 
tighter credit limits for nonwhite borrowers); Joseph G. Altonji and Ulrich Doraszelski, The Role 
of Permanent Income and Demographics in Black/White Differences in Wealth, 40 J Hum Res 1, 10 
(2005) (concluding that black men would have 20 percent more wealth if they earned the same 
permanent income as white men). Determining the causal mechanism behind this empirical regu-
larity is beyond the scope of this Article.  
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large pension or a substantial match in a defined contribution plan. 
Such a package will attract individuals with relatively low subjective dis-
count rates, whereas it will repel those individuals with high subjective 
discount rates, as they will view the package as being worth less than oth-
er available compensation options (offered by nondiscriminating em-
ployers). Note further that this could also represent a situation where a 
nondiscriminatory employer might engage in unintentional passive dis-
crimination, as employers may possess numerous other reasons to in-
clude a generous retirement component in its compensation package, 
as discussed in Part E. 
B. Sex 
While the evidence above suggests subjective discount rate hete-
rogeneity across races, evidence of heterogeneity also exists in the closely 
related concept of risk aversion among men and women. Specifically, 
many scholars agree that men exhibit a greater propensity to engage in 
risky activities than do women.60 More precisely, women appear to re-
quire a larger premium to accept a given increase in income volatility 
than do men. A number of causal explanations have been offered,61 but 
for our purposes, we need note only the observed existence of this 
differential. Experimental62 and observational studies63 well establish 
                                                                                                                           
 60 Of course, any individual woman may be more risk-seeking than any individual man or 
than the average man. 
 61 For example, many evolutionary psychologists explain this tendency as a manifestation of 
the handicap principle. If risk-taking is associated with higher mortality rates, then all other things 
being equal, high-quality males will find risky behavior less dangerous than low-quality males will, 
making the risk-taking behavior more affordable for high-quality males. Thus, potential mates can 
infer quality from risk-taking propensities. For a discussion along these lines, see Louise Barrett, 
Robin Dunbar, and John Lycett, Human Evolutionary Psychology, 114–18 (Palgrave 2002) 
(suggesting that male risk-taking may be a method for advertising strong genes). For a formal 
model, see Eddie Dekel and Suzanne Scotchmer, On the Evolution of Attitudes towards Risk 
in Winner-take-all Games, 87 J Econ Theory 125, 126 (1999) (emphasizing the selection advan-
tages of male risk-taking in animal groups in which the dominant male mates with all (or 
most) of the females).  
 62 Among the relevant experimental studies, see Gerlinde Fellner and Boris Maciejovsky, 
Risk Attitude and Market Behavior: Evidence from Experimental Asset Markets, 28 J Econ Psych 
338, 346 (2007) (noting female risk aversion in binary lottery choices); Peter Brooks and Horst 
Zank, Loss Averse Behavior, 31 J Risk & Uncertainty 301, 317–18 (2005) (observing that “[t]here 
are no risk seeking women”); Mette Wik, et al, On the Measurement of Risk Aversion from Expe-
rimental Data, 36 App Econ 2443, 2449 (2004) (finding female risk aversion in Northern Zam-
bian agricultural communities).  
 63 Relevant observational studies include John D. Leeth and John Ruser, Compensating 
Wage Differentials for Fatal and Nonfatal Injury Risk by Gender and Race, 27 J Risk & Uncer-
tainty 257, 262–67 (2003) (observing that women exact greater risk premiums in the workplace); 
Peggy D. Dwyer, James H. Gilkeson, and John A. List, Gender Differences in Revealed Risk 
Taking: Evidence from Mutual Fund Investors, 76 Econ Letters 151, 156 (2002) (demonstrating 
that women tend to take less risky positions when choosing mutual funds); Alma Cohen and 
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this result.64 Courts have also credited this observation, such as in the 
seminal case Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v Sears, 
Roebuck & Co.65  
An employer wishing to screen out female workers could exploit 
this empirical regularity by offering a highly volatile compensation 
package. For example, the employer could offer most of the job’s com-
pensation in the form of an employer match to a defined contribution 
plan and then restrict the available investment vehicles to high-risk 
portfolios.66 Alternatively, the employer could simply make a large frac-
tion of the employee’s compensation contingent on meeting some vari-
able performance goals, such as paying on a commission basis or 
through a profit-sharing arrangement. In fact, Peggy Dwyer, James Gil-
keson, and John List speculate that the paucity of women in the field of 
mutual fund investment management may be related to the industry’s 
practice of setting compensation as a share of performance.67 Some re-
lated evidence also suggests that organizing the workplace on the ba-
sis of competitive tournaments where employees compete head-to-head 
for bonus pay could induce women to forego the employment opportu-
nity.68 The literature also suggests the possibility that employers desiring 
a predominantly male workforce, at least in some industries, could subs-
titute higher wages for increased on-the-job safety, given that the risk 
aversion differential appears to spill over into safety-risk evaluation as 
                                                                                                                           
Liran Einav, Estimating Risk Preferences from Deductible Choice, 97 Am Econ Rev 745, 760–61 
(2007) (explaining that an econometric model based on observed auto insurance deductible 
choices reveals female risk aversion).  
 64 For a meta-analysis of a large number of studies on this topic, see James P. Byrnes, David 
C. Miller, and William D. Schafer, Gender Differences in Risk Taking: A Meta-analysis, 125 Psych 
Bull 367, 377 (1999) (finding that while males are more likely to take risks than females, the size 
of the difference varies and shifts according to context and age level). 
 65 628 F Supp 1264, 1310 (ND Ill 1986). 
 66 To some extent, § 404(c) of ERISA precludes this through its requirement that retire-
ment plans offer a “broad range” of investment alternatives. See Employee Retirement Income 
Security Act of 1974 § 404(c), Pub L 93-406, 88 Stat 877, codified at 29 USC § 1104(c); 29 CFR 
§ 2550.404c-5(c)(6). See also Regina Jefferson, Rethinking the Risk of Defined Contribution 
Plans, 4 Fla Tax Rev 607, 632–34 & n 111 (2000). 
 67 Dwyer, Gilkeson, and List, 76 Econ Letters at 157 (cited in note 63), citing Judith Chevalier 
and Glenn Ellison, Are Some Mutual Fund Managers Better Than Others? Cross-sectional Pat-
terns in Behavior and Performance, 54 J Fin 875, 896 (1999) (noting that only 7 percent of the 
mutual fund managers in the study’s sample were women). 
 68 See, for example, Nabanita Datta Gupta, Anders Poulsen, and Marie-Claire Villeval, 
Male and Female Competitive Behavior: Experimental Evidence 2 (IZA Discussion Paper 
No 1833, Nov 2005), online at http://ssrn.com/abstract=851227 (visited Apr 14, 2009) (observing 
that men were more likely than women to choose tournament schemes); Muriel Niederle and 
Lise Vesterlund, Do Women Shy Away from Competition? Do Men Compete Too Much?, 122 Q J 
Econ 1067, 1097 (2007) (noting that female preferences for nontournament compensation was 
not correlated with an inferior capability to compete in the task). 
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well.69 Of course, other nondiscriminatory reasons to organize compen-
sation packages in these ways likely exist, but differential risk aversion 
suggests another instance where an employer with discriminatory in-
tent could passively induce the desired workforce.70  
C. Religion 
Religion also raises a number of potentially interesting illustra-
tions. For example, businesses without Sunday hours may be relatively 
more attractive employers for religious Christians since these individu-
als may value a day off on Sunday more than a randomly chosen indi-
vidual due to their religious obligation to attend worship services and to 
generally limit activity on the Christian Sabbath day. The fast food fran-
chisor Chick-fil-A provides a particularly striking illustration of this 
insight. Chick-fil-A, founded by S. Truett Cathy, “a devoutly religious 
man who built his life and business based on hard work, humanity, and 
biblical principles,”71 requires that all of its locations be closed on Sun-
days “without exception.”72  
This practice could generate passive discrimination at two levels. 
As indicated above, employees who value having a Sunday-free sche-
dule relatively highly will be disproportionately attracted to apply for 
and accept Chick-fil-A positions. Perhaps more importantly, franchisees 
who are not religious Christians will be discouraged from opening fran-
chises with the franchisor. Relative to other fast food chains, Chick-fil-A 
effectively requires that the franchisee forego one-seventh of its poten-
tial revenues.73 While a religious Christian may view this revenue loss as 
a reasonable religious sacrifice, the nonreligious, or those who recognize 
a different holy day (for example, Fridays for Muslims or Saturdays for 
Jews) will not. This no-Sundays policy renders Chick-fil-A franchises 
relatively more “expensive” for non-Christian franchisees. 
                                                                                                                           
 69 See, for example, Thomas DeLeire and Helen Levy, Worker Sorting and the Risk of 
Death on the Job, 22 J Labor Econ 925, 926–27 (2004) (estimating that about one-quarter of 
occupational gender segregation is due to differential death risks across jobs).  
 70 The converse is also true. Employers seeking to attract members of a protected class 
may design or alter their compensation packages to reduce or eliminate the aspects that make 
them unattractive to such individuals. For instance, after 1977, Sears Roebuck “changed its me-
thod of compensating commission salespersons to a ‘salary plus commission basis’. . . to reduce 
the financial risk of selling on commission in an effort to attract more women to commission 
sales.” Sears, 628 F Supp at 1289.  
 71 Chick-fil-A, S. Truett Cathy, online at http://www.chick-fil-a.com/#struettcathy (visited 
Apr 14, 2009). 
 72 Id. 
 73 The one-seventh figure is only illustrative since a potential location may not have its 
revenues distributed uniformly across the days of the week, but the point remains that the clo-
sure almost surely generates a nontrivial loss of revenues for an individual franchisee.  
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Religiously affiliated schools provide another example where reli-
gion might generate heterogeneous valuations among employees. These 
types of private schools often include among their benefits free or re-
duced tuition for children of employees. While nonadherents of the 
given religion may value the private school benefit, individuals prac-
ticing the religion affiliated with the school are likely to value the 
benefit more highly, especially if the school infuses its curriculum with 
the religion’s values and worldview.74 
A final example of religion-based passive discrimination is high-
lighted by the case Catholic Charities of Sacramento, Inc v The Superior 
Court of Sacramento County.75 In that case, Catholic Charities, an inde-
pendently incorporated entity which describes itself as “an organ of the 
Catholic Church,”76 excluded contraception from its prescription drug 
coverage plan, which covered its 183 full-time employees. Catholic 
Charities maintained that they needed this exclusion to follow the 
Roman Catholic Church’s teaching that considers contraception a sin. 
Therefore, including birth control coverage under its plan would “im-
properly facilitate sin.”77 Litigation arose when Catholic Charities chal-
lenged a state law, the Women’s Contraception Equity Act (WCEA), 
which required it to cover prescription contraceptives if it provided 
group prescription drug coverage.  
While the Charities’ claim that its religious mission precluded it 
from subsidizing products prohibited by the Catholic Church is at least 
plausible,78 the benefit restriction disproportionately affects religious 
Catholics relative to others since the former, presumably, are less likely 
to use birth control drugs than individuals from the latter group. Giv-
en that the restriction is less costly for religious Catholics, making the 
compensation package relatively attractive to those individuals poten-
tially leads to passive discrimination. 
                                                                                                                           
 74 For a model and some empirical support of this proposition, see Danny Cohen-Zada, 
Preserving Religious Identity through Education: Economic Analysis and Evidence from the US, 
60 J Urb Econ 372, 393–94 (2006) (finding that religious parents are more likely to send their 
child to a private school espousing their religion if their religion would be in the minority at the 
local public school). For indirect evidence of the higher valuation of religious education by 
members of the religion, see David L. Leal, Latinos and School Vouchers: Testing the “Minority 
Support” Hypothesis, 85 Soc Sci Q 1227, 1236 (2004) (suggesting that Catholic religious affilia-
tion explains why Latinos support school vouchers).  
 75 85 P3d 67 (Cal 2004).  
 76 Id at 75.  
 77 Id. 
 78 See id at 74–76. The California Supreme Court, however, disagreed with this claim, 
explaining that Catholic Charities did not meet the criteria to be exempted from the WCEA as a 
religious employer because its services were not aimed entirely at Catholics. See id at 76. 
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D. Workplace Language Policies 
Some scholars have touched upon a similar phenomenon regard-
ing an employer’s choice to allow or encourage (or at least refrain 
from discouraging)79 the use of foreign languages in the workplace.80 If 
for various reasons the employer would prefer to hire members of a 
certain ethnic group (for example, Latinos) to the exclusion of another 
group of individuals competing in the same labor market (for exam-
ple, blacks),81 coupling a pro-foreign-language work policy with sub-
market wages might generate the desired segregation passively in 
ways that regulators or employees themselves will not find obvious.82  
E. Noninvidious Exploitation of Preference Heterogeneity 
Although we are primarily concerned with screening that leads to 
legally or normatively objectionable segregation, employers can ex-
ploit the same mechanism to achieve ends that most observers would 
view positively. In fact, this kind of beneficial screening has been ex-
amined both theoretically and empirically. 
One area where scholars have done significant empirical work 
involves the question of whether employers can use their compensa-
tion packages, specifically deferred compensation or pensions, to at-
tract desired types of employees while repelling disfavored types. 
Joanne Salop and Steven Salop offered the first screening model in 
this context, suggesting that, all other things equal, employers want to 
hire individuals who are likely to stay for a long period. Because 
workers often lack a mechanism to credibly transmit their private in-
formation regarding their propensity to stay, the employer may offer a 
compensation contract that particularly entices “stayers” while it is 
unattractive to “leavers.”83 Employers achieve their desired workforce 
by conditioning a significant portion of the employee’s income on re-
                                                                                                                           
 79 See Cristina M. Rodriguez, Language Diversity in the Workplace, 100 Nw U L Rev 1689, 
1703–25 (2006) (evaluating the social costs of English-only workplace rules).  
 80 Conversely, if an employer wanted to screen out members of a particular ethnic group, 
she could restrict the languages spoken in the workplace. 
 81 See Leticia M. Saucedo, The Employer Preference for the Subservient Worker and the Making 
of the Brown Collar Workplace, 67 Ohio St L J 961, 976–80 (2006) (hypothesizing that employers 
deliberately create jobs that are undesirable to native workers in order to attract a subservient 
immigrant workforce). 
 82 See Devon Carbado, Catherine Fisk, and Mitu Gulati, After Inclusion, 4 Ann Rev of L & 
Soc Sci, 83, 85–86 (2008) (noting the risk of discrimination by inclusion); Lan Cao, The Diaspora of 
Ethnic Economies: Beyond the Pale?, 44 Wm & Mary L Rev 1521, 1613–16 (2003) (observing that 
when employers refrain from an English language requirement coupled with low wages, they may 
disproportionately draw from members of ethnic minority communities). 
 83 Joanne Salop and Steven Salop, Self-selection and Turnover in the Labor Market, 90 Q J 
Econ 619, 627 (1976).  
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maining with the employer for a sufficient period via pension benefits 
that grow with time of service. Individuals who plan to move on quick-
ly will find such an arrangement unattractive since they would then 
earn submarket pay over the course of their employment.84 Because 
having a mechanism by which employers can detect the employee’s 
type is better in aggregate welfare terms, screening in this context is 
generally unobjectionable and even normatively preferable.85 
Perhaps a more general way in which employers may exploit pre-
ference heterogeneity for more benign or even attractive ends is to use 
below-market wages to ensure that only those individuals with a partic-
ular “taste” for the job apply. That is, many employers would like to have 
employees who particularly “believe in” or enjoy working in a given posi-
tion. However, at the hiring stage, every applicant possesses an incentive 
to claim to have such tastes. As hiring and firing employees generally 
entails meaningful costs, simply waiting until the individual is in the 
position to determine whether she told the truth regarding her prefe-
rences is a bad strategy. One way to screen for employees with a high 
consumption value with respect to the job is to purposefully offer sub-
market wages. By doing so, only those individuals who receive psychic 
compensation from doing a job they love will rationally choose to ac-
cept the job. Examples of positions in the legal field where the pay is 
relatively low (compared to feasible alternatives) but the supply of in-
terested employees remains strong may include federal judges, prose-
cutors, and public defenders. All other things equal, the relatively low 
pay may increase the likelihood that only very dedicated individuals 
will accept these jobs. 
                                                                                                                           
 84 A large empirical literature arose to examine this phenomenon. See, for example, Ri-
chard A. Ippolito, Stayers As “Workers” and “Savers”: Toward Reconciling the Pension-quit Lite-
rature, 37 J Hum Res 275, 305 (2002) (noting a correlation between saving for retirement and 
staying on the job even when retirement benefits vest immediately); Richard A. Ippolito, A Study 
of Wages and Reliability, 39 J L & Econ 149, 185, 187 (1996) (suggesting that a worker’s wages 
may be affected by her expected and observed reliability); Steven G. Allen, Robert L. Clark, and 
Ann A. McDermed, Pensions, Bonding, and Lifetime Jobs, 28 J Hum Res 463, 479 (1993) (suggest-
ing that the low turnover of pensioned employees may be more related to a pension-providing 
employer’s reluctance to lay off rather than the employees’ reluctance to leave); Alan L. Gust-
man and Thomas L. Steinmeier, Pension Portability and Labor Mobility: Evidence from the Sur-
vey of Income and Program Participation, 50 J Pub Econ 299, 315–17 (1993) (observing that 
pension-covered jobs offer higher levels of compensation than workers can obtain elsewhere). 
 85 For support of this position, see Richard A. Ippolito, Pension Plans and Employee Per-
formance: Evidence, Analysis, and Policy 155 (Chicago 1998) (noting the importance of employee 
reliability and the benefits of compensation schemes that screen for reliable workers).  
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III.  THE INADEQUACY OF TITLE VII IN THE PASSIVE 
DISCRIMINATION CONTEXT 
We begin by describing the basic framework for Title VII 86 claims. 
We then note that passive discrimination poses some special problems 
under existing doctrine. These doctrinal hurdles include the emphasis 
on differential treatment rather than differential valuation under dispa-
rate treatment analysis, the likely exclusion of fringe benefits under dis-
parate impact analysis, and courts’ focus on choice and so-called “lack 
of interest.” We conclude this Part with a discussion of some important 
limitations on a litigation approach to remedying workplace discrimina-
tion, with particular attention to how these limitations are likely to im-
pede the successful use of Title VII in the passive discrimination context. 
In determining the legality of passive discrimination, we begin 
with the basic statutory framework. Title VII is the major federal legis-
lation that governs workplace discrimination and courts generally rec-
ognize it is intended to reach broadly across employment practices.87 
Congress enacted this statute “to assure equality of employment oppor-
tunities and to eliminate those discriminatory practices and devices 
which have fostered . . . stratified job environments to the disadvantage 
of minority [or other protected] citizens.”88 Congress drafted Title VII 
both to end workplace discrimination going forward and to remedy 
individual injuries.89  
Many scholars and judges view Title VII as fostering individual 
employee choice and counteracting employers’ impulse to apply group 
stereotypes to individuals.90 The underlying intuition seems to be that 
                                                                                                                           
 86 Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub L No 88-352, 78 Stat 253, codified at 42 
USC § 2000e et seq. 
 87 See, for example, Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1963, HR Rep 570, 88th Cong, 
1st Sess 2 (“The evidence before the committee makes it abundantly clear that job opportunity 
discrimination permeates the national social fabric—North, South, East, and West. The act is 
directed at correcting such abuses wherever found and is not focused upon any single section of 
the country.”). See also Franks v Bowman Transportation Co, 424 US 747, 763 (1976) (“Congress 
intended to prohibit all practices in whatever form which create inequality in employment op-
portunity due to discrimination on the basis of race, religion, sex, or national origin.”); McDon-
nell Douglas Co v Green, 411 US 792, 800 (1973) (stating that the “language of Title VII makes 
plain the purpose of Congress to assure equality of employment opportunities and to eliminate 
. . . discriminatory practices and devices”); Griggs v Duke Power Co, 401 US 424, 429 (1971) 
(explaining that Congress’s objective in enacting Title VII was “to remove barriers that have 
operated in the past to favor an identifiable group”). 
 88 McDonnell, 411 US at 800. 
 89 See Oscar Mayer & Co v Evans, 441 US 750, 756 (1979). 
 90 See, for example, Sprogis v United Air Lines, Inc, 444 F2d 1194, 1198 (7th Cir 1971) (“In 
forbidding employers to discriminate against individuals because of their sex, Congress intended 
to strike at the entire spectrum of disparate treatment of men and women resulting from sex 
stereotypes.”). See also City of Los Angeles Department of Water and Power v Manhart, 435 US 
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regardless of whether a stereotype is true or false as to a disfavored 
group, it may be false as to any individual who is a member of that 
group. In the hiring context, for example, each individual should have 
the opportunity to have her qualifications for a job evaluated and ex-
press her preference for such work.91 
While Congress hoped that mandating equal opportunity would 
eradicate employment discrimination, Congress did not focus on di-
rectly ending workplace segregation but rather forecasted that inte-
gration would be a beneficial byproduct of ending active discrimina-
tion. With few exceptions, Title VII does not promote or even permit 
quotas or other forms of affirmative action to address workplace se-
gregation.92 Congress decided to address employers’ ability to deny 
equal opportunities to individuals because of their race, color, sex, 
national origin, or religion, rather than dictate that employers achieve 
equal representation or equal outcomes in workplaces. Thus, for ex-
ample, while a segregated workplace may raise inferences about an 
employer’s potentially discriminatory behavior, absent evidence of 
direct discrimination, the decision by individuals in a protected group 
not to work in a particular firm or even industry is generally unprob-
lematic.93 Thus, Title VII makes it an unlawful employment practice for 
an employer to “fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual or 
otherwise to discriminate against any individual with respect to his 
compensation, terms or conditions or privileges of employment, be-
cause of such individual’s race, color, religion, sex or national origin.”94 
                                                                                                                           
702, 707 (1978) (“It is now well recognized that employment decisions cannot be predicated on 
mere ‘stereotyped’ impressions about the characteristics of males or females.”). 
 91 For instance, as the Supreme Court noted in a case about female prison guards, “In the 
usual case, the argument that a particular job is dangerous for women may appropriately be met 
by the rejoinder that it is the purpose of Title VII to allow the individual to make that choice for 
herself.” Dothard v Rawlinson, 433 US 321, 335 (1977). 
 92 In fact, § 703(j) dictates that nothing in Title VII  
shall be interpreted to require any employer . . . to grant preferential treatment to any indi-
vidual or to any group because of the [protected characteristic] of such individual or group 
on account of an imbalance which may exist with respect to the total number or percentage 
of persons of any [protected characteristic] employed by any employer . . . in comparison 
with the total number or percentage of persons of such [protected characteristic] in any 
community, State, section, or other area. 
42 USC § 2000e-2(j). 
 93 If the numbers are bad enough, a firm might be concerned about a pattern-and-practice 
lawsuit. See Hazelwood School District v United States, 433 US 299, 307–08 (1977) (“Where gross 
statistical disparities can be shown, they alone may in a proper case constitute prima facie proof 
of a pattern or practice of discrimination.”). 
 94 Section 703(2) also makes it an unlawful employment practice for an employer to “to limit, 
segregate, or classify his employees or applicants for employment in any way which would deprive 
or tend to deprive any individual of employment opportunities or otherwise adversely affect his 
status as an employee, because of such individual’s race, color, religion, sex or national origin.” 42 
USC § 2000e-2(a)(1). 
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Passive discrimination might implicate two different prohibitions 
contained in Title VII. First, some have suggested that the active crafting 
of a sorting strategy might be construed as a failure or refusal to hire. We 
are skeptical of this proposition, as our hypotheticals presume that em-
ployers attempt to get workers to self-sort but that they will also hire any 
individual who accepts the offered compensation and fringe benefit 
package.95 Second, such a sorting strategy might instead be construed as 
“otherwise to discriminate with respect to compensation” and to “terms, 
conditions or privileges of employment.”96 Congress elected not to define 
this language so that courts would read these terms as broadly as possi-
ble.97 In offering illustrative examples, the Equal Employment Opportuni-
ty Commission (EEOC) guidelines98 interpret  “compensation” to include 
fringe benefits such as “medical, hospital, accident, life insurance and re-
tirement benefits; profit-sharing and bonus plans; [and] leave.”99 The 
EEOC compliance manual also includes such practices or activities as 
“duration of work, work rules, job assignments and duties” as terms, 
conditions, or privileges of employment.100 
Despite its seemingly blanket prohibition on workplace discrimi-
nation, Title VII further states that employers may lawfully  
apply different standards of compensation, or different terms, 
conditions, or privileges of employment pursuant to a bona fide 
seniority or merit system, or a system which measures earnings 
by quantity or quality or production . . . , provided that such dif-
ferences are not the result of an intention to discriminate because 
of race, color, religion, sex or national origin.101 
For example, to return to the brewery, employers may pay individual 
workers performing the same sales job different wages based on the 
amount of beer each is able to sell. So if all male employees sell more 
beer than any female employee, the employer may permissibly pay all 
                                                                                                                           
 95 Of course, in practice, an employer might both encourage self-sorting and refuse to hire indi-
viduals from a disfavored group. Such a combination of practices is easier to deal with under Title VII 
than our hypothesized litigation-savvy employer or unintentional passive discriminator who lacks 
any desire to exclude these individuals because of their membership in a disfavored group. 
 96 42 USC § 2000e-2(a)(1). 
 97 Rogers v Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, 454 F2d 234, 238 (5th Cir 1971). 
See also 1 EEOC Compliance Manual § 613.1(a) at 3002 (cited in note 12). 
 98 While courts have not decided how much deference is due to the EEOC interpretive 
guidelines, as the EEOC is Title VII’s enforcement authority, courts often look to these guidelines 
in making their decisions. 
 99 29 CFR § 1604.9(a).  
 100 1 EEOC Compliance Manual § 613.1(a) at 3002 (cited in note 12). 
 101 42 USC § 2000e-2(h). Under Title VII, “the terms ‘because of sex’ or ‘on the basis of sex’ 
include, but are not limited to, because of or on the basis of pregnancy, childbirth, or related 
medical conditions.” 42 USC § 2000e(k). 
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the men higher wages than all of the females though they all perform 
the same job. We next turn to the specific claims and defenses relevant 
to assessing passive discrimination under Title VII.  
A. Disparate Treatment Claims 
Under traditional Title VII jurisprudence, plaintiffs may choose 
among disparate treatment and disparate impact claims to seek recov-
ery for employment discrimination. Under the theory of disparate 
treatment, “[t]he employer simply treats some people less favorably 
than others because of their race, color, religion, sex, or national ori-
gin. Proof of discriminatory motive is critical, although it can in some 
situations be inferred from the mere fact of differences in treat-
ment.”102 Employers charged with disparate treatment cannot raise a 
business necessity defense.103 They may, however, in the absence of 
direct evidence, prevail if the plaintiff is unable to prove that the de-
fendant’s proffered legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the par-
ticular employment practice is a pretext for discrimination. 
Within disparate treatment claims, plaintiffs may raise either in-
dividual claims or pattern-and-practice claims. In individual claims, 
each plaintiff must prove that she was treated less favorably than others 
similarly situated and this disparate treatment was “because of” the plain-
tiff’s race, color, sex, national origin, or religion. The plaintiff must provide 
either direct or circumstantial evidence to demonstrate the employer’s 
discriminatory intent. In pattern-and-practice cases, discriminatory intent 
is also required, but the plaintiff can satisfy the prima facie case with “sta-
tistical evidence demonstrating substantial disparities in the application 
of employment actions as to minorities and the unprotected groups.”104 
Pattern-and-practice plaintiffs need not present individual victim testi-
mony to support a finding of intentional discrimination—courts may rely 
purely on evidence of gross statistical disparity,105 which raises an infe-
rence of discriminatory intent. While disparate treatment, particularly in 
pattern-and-practice cases, may evidence a concern about segregation, 
courts link this concern to the elimination of discriminatory practices 
that deprive individuals of employment opportunities or otherwise ad-
                                                                                                                           
 102 International Brotherhood of Teamsters v United States, 431 US 324, 335 n 15 (1977). 
 103 See 42 USC § 2000e-2(k)(2). 
 104 Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v Sears, Roebuck & Co, 839 F2d 302, 308 
(7th Cir 1988). 
 105 Id at 310–11. See also Hazelwood, 433 US at 307–08. Courts acknowledge that this use of 
statistics is particularly important in hiring cases where individual applicants may not be aware 
of other hirings. See, for example, Sears, 839 F2d at 312. 
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versely affect their employment status,106 rather than view their role as 
one requiring the direct eradication of segregation as an end in itself.107 
Under disparate treatment claims, whether individual or pattern-
and-practice cases, Title VII prohibits the employer from using group-
based characteristics or preferences or stereotypes to treat individuals 
differently even if such stereotypes are largely accurate. So, for example, 
in City of Los Angeles Department of Water and Power v Manhart,108 
the Supreme Court ruled that an employer may not deduct more from 
women’s pay to cover their pensions even though, as an actuarial matter, 
women as a class are likely to draw on pension benefits longer.109 Al-
though economic reasoning rather than animus motivated the employ-
er’s behavior, the Supreme Court reasoned that as any individual wom-
an may not draw longer than any individual man, her employers may not 
condition her pay based on her sex.110 Similarly, in Arizona Governing 
Committee for Tax Deferred Annuity and Deferred Compensation 
Plans v Norris,111 the Supreme Court prohibited the employers’ use of 
voluntary pension plans in which companies utilized sex-based mortali-
ty tables to justify paying women lower monthly retirement benefits 
than those they paid to men who had made equivalent contributions.112 
In both cases, the Court rejected the employers’ proffered economic 
rationale as irrelevant.113 
The mechanism of passive discrimination may take it out of the 
realm of what counts as “discrimination” under Title VII. For instance, in 
both disparate treatment and disparate impact cases, courts look at the 
market value of wages and fringe benefits provided by the employer or 
the monetary amount of the deduction, rather than the subjective valu-
ation by a particular disfavored group or by an individual within this 
group. So in Manhart, the Supreme Court determined that the employ-
er discriminated by taking more money from women than from men to 
                                                                                                                           
 106 See, for example, Marion v Slaughter Co, 1999 WL 1267015, *6 (10th Cir). 
 107 See, for example, McDonnell Douglas Co, 411 US at 800 (explaining that because “[t]he 
language of Title VII makes plain the purpose of Congress to assure equality of employment oppor-
tunities . . . . ‘[T]he Act does not command that any person be hired simply because he was for-
merly the subject of discrimination’”), quoting Griggs, 401 US at 430–31. 
 108 435 US 702 (1978). 
 109 See id at 711. In Manhart, the defendant used mortality tables and its own experience to 
determine that the cost of a pension for the average retired female would be greater than for the 
average retired male. The city required female employees to make greater monthly contributions 
to the pension fund, which reduced the women’s take-home pay. See id at 705. 
 110 See id at 708. Notably, the Court rejected the argument that facially equal deductions 
might impose a disparate impact on men who as a class were less likely to benefit as fully from 
the pension plan. See id at 708–09.  
 111 463 US 1073 (1983). 
 112 See id at 1084–86 (“[E]ven a true generalization about a class cannot justify class-based 
treatment.”). 
 113 See id at 1084; Manhart, 435 US at 709. 
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provide pensions. This result generated much controversy, with some 
scholars suggesting: (1) that Title VII ought not extend to rational dis-
crimination, and (2) that the court improperly determined discrimina-
tion based on the employee’s costs rather than the employee’s actual or 
expected value or her subjective assessment of that value.114 The Su-
preme Court in Norris declined to accept either of these contentions, 
expanding Manhart and establishing a now well-respected precedent. 
Since the Supreme Court has foreclosed the avenue of pursuing 
passive discrimination claims as disparate treatment in fringe benefits 
or compensation, plaintiffs may try instead to construe passive discrim-
ination as disparate treatment in hiring. In the absence of direct or 
strong circumstantial evidence of discriminatory intent, courts would 
draw no inference of intentional discrimination from the hiring practice  
even if the employer would prefer to employ people drawn pre-
dominantly or even entirely from [a particular group]. Discrimina-
tion is not preference or aversion; it is acting on the preference or 
aversion. If the most efficient method of hiring, adopted because it 
is the most efficient . . . just happens to produce a work force whose 
racial or religious or ethnic or national-origin or gender composi-
tion pleases the employer, this is not intentional discrimination.115 
For many of our hypotheticals, the fringe benefits package or method 
of compensation is by definition most efficient for that employer.116 
Those that are not most efficient may still be defended under the em-
ployer’s weak burden to produce evidence of a legitimate business justi-
fication. Even if a smoking gun of discriminatory intent were present, 
the defendant could still prevail if he showed that this hiring practice 
would also have been adopted on the basis of efficiency justifications.117  
                                                                                                                           
 114 See George J. Benston, The Economics of Gender Discrimination in Employee Fringe 
Benefits: Manhart Revisited, 49 U Chi L Rev 489, 542 (1982) (arguing that accounting for mortal-
ity tables when organizing a pension plan ought not violate Title VII); Mayer G. Freed and Da-
niel D. Polsby, Privacy, Efficiency, and the Equality of Men and Women: A Revisionist View of Sex 
Discrimination in Employment, Am Bar Found Res J 583, 624–31 (1981) (arguing that Manhart 
failed to consider Title VII’s recognition of prevalent social norms of gender differences); Spencer 
L. Kimball, Reverse Discrimination: Manhart, Am Bar Found Res J 83, 127 (1979) (suggesting 
that Manhart be given the narrowest possible interpretation).  
 115 Equal Employment Opportunity Commision v Consolidated Service Systems, 989 F2d 
233, 236 (7th Cir 1993). In Consolidated Service Systems, 73 percent of applicants and 81 percent 
of hires at the Korean-owned company were Korean. At most 3 percent of the relevant work 
force in the area was Korean. The EEOC declined to pursue its disparate impact claim on ap-
peal. Id at 235–36. 
 116 For instance, the provision of free school tuition can be economically justified regardless 
of whether the employer desires to induce segregation. It costs less for schools to provide tuition 
than for employees to purchase such tuition on the open market.  
 117 Consolidated Service Systems, 989 F2d at 236: 
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Easy disparate treatment cases include instances in which an em-
ployee offers a potential plaintiff a facially different wage than others 
similarly situated. For example, an employer may offer to pay male 
bus drivers $20 an hour and offer to pay equally qualified female bus 
drivers $15 an hour. Similarly, the employer may offer Caucasian bus 
drivers comprehensive health insurance and fail to offer African-
American drivers the same insurance package. Even if such a facially 
discriminatory policy were designed to favor individuals within the 
protected group, it would be impermissible. So, for example, an em-
ployer could not lawfully assign female bus drivers to daytime routes 
and assign male bus drivers to nighttime routes under the rationale 
that women might find the nighttime routes less safe or more difficult 
to manage with child care responsibilities. 
If, on the other hand, the employer offers all bus drivers lower wages 
and higher pension benefits than other area employers, individual em-
ployees cannot successfully lodge a disparate treatment claim. Even if 
empirical evidence indicates that, as a group, African-American drivers 
are the least likely to draw from such a pension plan or that African-
American drivers have a higher discount rate and place a lower value 
on such pensions, the employer has treated each individual black driv-
er the same as all its other drivers. Courts look at objective treatment 
from the employer’s perspective—not at subjective interpretation or 
valuation of treatment from the employee’s perspective. So we con-
tend no individual disparate treatment claim could succeed.  
Under pattern-and-practice claims, however, if employers devised 
a very successful sorting mechanism, plaintiffs might be able to satisfy 
the prima facie showing of gross statistical disparity. For instance, in 
International Brotherhood of Teamsters v United States,118 the Supreme 
Court, sidestepping a debate over proper statistical analysis,119 sug-
gested that the complete or very nearly complete absence of members 
of a protected class in a particular job can compel an inference of dis-
crimination.120 Later courts have been “particularly dubious of attempts 
by employers to explain away ‘the inexorable zero.’”121 Some have gone 
so far as to suggest that “the 100% sex-segregated workforce is highly 
                                                                                                                           
[I]f, though the motives behind adoption of the [word-of-mouth hiring] method were a mix-
ture of discrimination and efficiency, [the employer] would have adopted the identical me-
thod of recruitment even if he had no interest in the national origin of his employees, the 
fact that he had such an interest would not be a “but for” cause of the discriminatory out-
come and [ ] there would be no liability. 
 118 431 US 324 (1977). 
 119 Id at 335 n 15. 
 120 See id at 342 n 23. See also Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v Andrew 
Corp, 1989 WL 32884, *14 (ND Ill).  
 121 Capaci v Katz & Besthoff, Inc, 711 F2d 647, 662 (5th Cir 1983).  
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suspicious and is sometimes alone sufficient to support judgment for 
the plaintiff.”122 So if the high pension, low wages strategy resulted in a 
workforce with no or very few African-American drivers in a labor 
pool with many qualified African-American drivers, employers may 
face a Title VII problem. Yet despite judicial statements that mere 
evidence of statistical disparity is sufficient to satisfy the prima facie 
case, plaintiffs rarely prevail in such cases without testimony about 
individual acts of discrimination.123 In fact, many circuits are diluting 
the inference to be drawn from the inexorable zero, with some circuits 
merging it “into statistical disparity analysis, focusing on the diagnostic 
value of the zero in comparison to other forms of statistical analysis.”124 
Only if the employer foolishly allowed the discovery of direct 
evidence of discriminatory intent, such as a memo that reads “our 
workplace provides generous pension benefits because we wish to at-
tract Caucasian workers and repel African-American workers,” will the 
employer face real difficulty in providing nondiscriminatory explana-
tions for the gross disparity.125 Even then, the plaintiffs might not pre-
vail. Such a memo would reveal race-based animus and an intent to 
achieve a segregated workplace, but a plaintiff still bears the burden of 
proving the occurrence of discrimination as defined by Title VII. As men-
tioned earlier, § 703(a) prohibits discrimination against “any individual” 
because of such “individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or national origin,” 
whereas here the employer has relied on preferences that tend to be 
correlated with protected characteristics but has offered each individual 
a package that is facially equal to the packages offered to all other job 
candidates.126 Even though most or even all individuals with a protected 
                                                                                                                           
 122 Loyd v Phillips Brothers, Inc, 25 F3d 518, 524 n 4 (7th Cir 1994). 
 123 For a view that statistics alone are not compelling, see Sears, 839 F2d at 360 (Cudahy 
dissenting). 
 124 Leticia M. Saucedo, Addressing Segregation in the Brown Collar Workplace: Toward a 
Solution for the Inexorable 100%, 41 U Mich J L Ref 447, 485 (2008). Circuit courts have split on 
how to treat the inexorable zero; most treat it as rebuttable presumption that the employer 
intended to exclude, while a minority require additional evidence to establish an inference of 
discrimination. See id at 475. 
 125 Similarly, if employers purposely use commission-based salaries as a mechanism to screen 
out women, then it will not qualify for Title VII’s exception for differential pay under “a merit 
system or system which measures earnings by quantity or quality or production,” as the differences 
would be “the result of an intention to discriminate because of race, color, religion, sex or na-
tional origin.” 42 USC § 2000e-2(h). See also 2 EEOC Compliance Manual § 10-IV(F)(1) at 6729 
(CCA 2003) (providing permissible examples such as paying word processors by the number of 
documents produced and paying sales people on their volume of sales). If such screening oc-
curred because employers used commission as a proxy for ambitious salespersons, then § 703(h) 
permits it. Nonetheless, if, such screening is a result of discriminatory intent, but no direct evi-
dence of such intent exists, the defendant is likely to prevail.  
 126 Compare 42 USC § 2000e-2(a)(1), with Teamsters, 431 US at 335 n 15: 
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characteristic may subjectively value the package less than other indi-
viduals, the employer has relied on group-based preferences but has 
left it to the individual to decide whether to accept the job and the 
benefits package. Perhaps, though, a court faced with such direct evi-
dence of discriminatory animus might analogize it to harassment cases 
in which employer behavior, when sufficiently severe and pervasive, is 
taken to constitute a change in the terms and conditions of employment 
for the harassed individual.127 If the benefits package is constructed in 
such a way as to discourage all or nearly all individuals with a protected 
characteristic, perhaps a court would view that as the equivalent of of-
fering a facially discriminatory benefits package.  
Alternatively, courts might use such memos or other direct evi-
dence of discriminatory intent to construe such employer efforts to 
segregate as a hiring policy. For instance, in word-of-mouth hiring, a 
practice that might be viewed as similar to what we term passive dis-
crimination, an employer might ask or merely rely on employees to 
provide applicants rather than use easily accessed advertisements or 
filings with state employment agencies. When employers engage in 
such behavior with the intent to create a segregated workforce, courts 
have deemed such practices discriminatory; but conversely, when 
companies merely allow this practice or no direct evidence of discri-
                                                                                                                           
Disparate treatment such as is alleged in the present case is the most easily understood type of 
discrimination. The employer simply treats some people less favorably than others because of 
their race, color, religion, sex, or national origin. Proof of discriminatory motive is critical, al-
though it can in some situations be inferred from the mere fact of differences in treatment. 
(emphasis added). Contrast our hypotheticals with the finding of the Court in Teamsters in which 
“numerous qualified . . . applicants . . . either had their requests ignored, were given false or mislead-
ing information about requirements, opportunities, and application procedures, or were not consi-
dered and hired on the same basis that whites were considered and hired.” Id at 338.  
 127 See Faragher v City of Boca Raton, 524 US 775, 786 (1998) (holding that Title VII encom-
passes more than formally different terms and conditions of employment and includes hostile work 
environments that also alter the initial terms of the employment relationship). Even in harassment 
cases, however, harassed workers are being treated differently than other individuals. If everyone is 
subject to similarly unwelcome and severe or pervasive behavior, such harassment is not actionable. 
See Malhotra v Cotter & Co, 885 F2d 1305, 1308 (7th Cir 1989) (“A member of [a racial minority 
group] has no right to a more congenial working environment than a white male, and therefore he 
can complain only about harassment that is discriminatory in character or purpose.”). 
Another possibility is that a court could use § 703(m) as a standalone provision. This provi-
sion states: “Except as otherwise provided in this [Act], an unlawful employment practice is 
established when the complaining party demonstrates that race, color, religion, sex, or national 
origin was a motivating factor for any employment practice, even though other factors also moti-
vated the practice.” 42 USC § 2000e-2(m). This provision seems concerned with so-called mixed 
motive cases but might also be interpreted to suggest that Title VII prohibits any employer prac-
tice motivated by a protected characteristic, including crafting compensation packages, even if 
the practice results in facially neutral treatment.  
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minatory intent exists, courts often find it unobjectionable, as it is 
much cheaper than alternative hiring strategies.128  
So in some ways, passive discrimination looks like word-of-mouth 
hiring in that it yields segregated workforces without forcing employ-
ers to reject disfavored applicants. In addition, in both word-of-mouth 
hiring cases and in most of our hypotheticals, the employment practice 
is by definition efficient for that employer.129 Thus, the defendant could 
still avoid damages in either scenario if he showed that the particular 
hiring practice would also have been adopted on the basis of efficien-
cy justifications.130 Yet in a meaningful sense, even tacit approval of 
word-of-mouth hiring constitutes discrimination in a way that our hy-
potheticals do not. Word-of-mouth hiring excludes disfavored workers 
from the applicant pool and thus from hiring opportunities. In passive 
discrimination, however, all potential employees have equal access to 
the applicant pool and are presented with identical opportunities. We 
assume the employer is willing to and does make offers to disfavored 
applicants in the hope that they will turn down the jobs.131  
The examples of passive discrimination raised in this Article gen-
erally do not fall under disparate treatment analysis.132 If employers ren-
dered African-Americans ineligible for pension benefits, denied women 
access to commission jobs, or prohibited only native Spanish speakers 
from speaking Spanish at work, workers could raise viable claims under 
the disparate treatment model.133 Title VII clearly prohibits employers 
                                                                                                                           
 128 See, for example, Consolidated Service Systems, 989 F2d at 235–36 (7th Cir 1993). The 
Seventh Circuit made clear that no inference of intentional discrimination could be drawn from 
the mere existence of the word-of-mouth hiring practice. But see Andrew Corp, 1989 WL 32884 
at *18 (holding that a word-of-mouth hiring system for clerical employees was discriminatory, as 
its implementation, coupled with a work force from which minorities had been excluded, perpe-
tuated an all-white work force). 
 129 For instance, the provision of free school tuition is economically justifiable regardless of 
whether the employer desires to discriminate. The case still may reach the jury as the employer 
must believe the economic rationale—she cannot merely refer to efficiency if it is not claimed to 
have motivated her decisionmaking.  
 130 See Consolidated Service Systems, 989 F2d at 236. See also note 117. 
 131 We believe Title VII could capture cases in which the employer attempts to get workers 
to self-sort but also refuses to hire those undesired workers who are willing to accept employ-
ment. Our hypotheticals presume a litigation-savvy employer who wishes both to comply with 
Title VII and to have a segregated workforce. 
 132 Some sex discrimination cases, however, are more complicated, with some courts sug-
gesting that the failure to cover contraceptives may count as disparate treatment and some aca-
demics further contending that the failure to cover infertility treatments may also be included. 
 133 Passive discrimination, as it occurs in the religious context, presents some distinct doc-
trinal questions as the text of Title VII contains two religious exemptions. First, the educational 
programs exemption allows an educational institution to hire an employee within a specific religion, 
if the institution is run by a particular religion or if the institution’s curriculum propagates a particu-
lar religion. 42 USC § 2000e-2(e)(2). This exemption covers all employees regardless of whether 
their activities are intimately connected with the institution’s religious activities. By its terms, it 
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from treating individuals differently because of discriminatory animus 
or outmoded stereotypes or even seemingly rational group-based ste-
reotypes.134 Yet, as currently conceived, disparate treatment claims see-
mingly do not prohibit the employer from using group-based characte-
ristics, preferences, or stereotypes to treat individuals similarly in hopes 
that such treatment will encourage applicants from disfavored groups 
to sort themselves out of a job based on their own preferences. As any 
individual applicant may defy the stereotype and elect into the job, no 
disparate treatment has occurred even if an employer succeeds in 
achieving a segregated workplace. Such a construction of disparate 
treatment claims fosters Title VII’s implied guarantee of equal oppor-
tunities, not equal outcomes.  
B. Disparate Impact 
In contrast, disparate impact claims allow plaintiffs to prevail even 
when they have not been treated differently than other employees and 
lack direct proof of the intent to discriminate.135 First elucidated in 
Griggs v Duke Power Co,136 a plaintiff can succeed if she identifies a 
particular employment practice with a significant adverse impact on a 
                                                                                                                           
does not cover terms and conditions of employment as they relate to compensation. The other 
exception allows religious corporations to discriminate in employment with respect to those 
individuals who perform work connected with “the carrying on by such corporation, association, 
educational institution, or society of its activities.” 42 USC § 2000e-1(a). In determining the scope 
of this exception, courts weigh “significant religious and secular characteristics . . . to determine 
whether the corporation’s purpose and character are primarily religious.” Equal Employment 
Opportunity Commission v Townley Engineering & Manufacturing Co, 859 F2d 610, 618 (9th Cir 
1988). Legislative history of the § 702 amendment suggests judges should construe the exemp-
tion narrowly and courts tend to weigh for-profit status and secular output heavily against quali-
fying an organization as a religious corporation. See id at 618–19. So only a very narrow range of 
employers may discriminate in hiring. For instance, Chick-fil-A would not qualify for such an 
exemption. That being said, qualifying schools could simply refuse to hire outside the religion. If 
such institutions do so in an effort to covertly rather than legally and overtly discriminate, atten-
tion to this disparity could force schools to be candid about their religious agenda. 
 134 Title VII also contains a bona fide occupational qualifications (BFOQ) defense in which 
considering the sex, religion, or national origin of a potential employee is “reasonably necessary to 
the normal operation of that particular business or enterprise.” 42 USC § 2000e-2(e)(1). Courts 
construe the BFOQ exception narrowly. See, for example, Dothard, 433 US at 334 (stating that due 
to the restrictive language of the statute, the relevant legislative history, and the interpretation of the 
EEOC, the BFOQ exception should be an extremely narrow exception). In addition, the BFOQ 
defense generally does not apply to terms and conditions of employment such as compensation 
packages. See Equal Employment Opportunity Commission  v Fremont Christian School, 781 F2d 
1362, 1366–67 (9th Cir 1986) (invalidating a discriminatory health insurance benefit plan that 
awarded benefits premised on a religious belief that only men can be heads of households and 
holding that the BFOQ exception “does not apply to the full range of possibly discriminatory em-
ployment actions”). 
 135 See Michael Selmi, Was the Disparate Impact Theory a Mistake?, 53 UCLA L Rev 701, 
782 (2006). 
 136 401 US 424 (1971). 
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protected class and the defendant “fails to demonstrate that the chal-
lenged employment practice is job related for the position in question 
and consistent with business necessity.”137 If the challenged practice sig-
nificantly serves the legitimate employment goals of the employer,138 
the plaintiff can still prevail if she can prove that a less discriminatory 
alternative employment practice equally serves the defendants’ goals.139 
Passive discrimination seemingly fits better under a disparate impact 
analysis, as employers devise facially neutral compensation packages 
and other terms and conditions that may result in fewer individuals 
from a disfavored group in a workplace than would otherwise exist in 
the absence of such mechanisms. 
The plaintiff bears the initial burden of demonstrating that a facially 
neutral employment practice has a significant adverse impact on a pro-
tected class.140 To use women as an example, a female plaintiff can make 
such a showing through at least three different methods: (1) showing 
the suspect employment practice excludes women in a specified geo-
graphical area at a substantially higher rate than men, (2) providing 
evidence of the percentage of female applicants that are actually ex-
cluded by the practice, or (3) documenting the level of employment of 
women by the employer in comparison with the percentage of women 
in the relevant labor market or geographic area.141 For instance, if a res-
taurant required applicants to bench press one hundred pounds in or-
der to be considered for a wait staff job, female plaintiffs could likely 
use any of the methods above to demonstrate a disparate impact.142 The 
                                                                                                                           
 137 42 USC § 2000e-2(k) (codifying the standard set out in Griggs, 401 US at 429–33). 
 138 See, for example, Watson v Fort Worth Bank & Trust, 487 US 977, 998–99 (1988) (stating 
that certain hiring practices, such as university tenure systems, may have a discriminatory impact, 
but are still valid if they are legitimately related to a sufficient business purpose); New York City 
Transit Authority v Beazer, 440 US 568, 587 n 31 (1979) (upholding a prohibition against hiring 
current methadone users because the prohibition served the legitimate employment goals of 
safety and efficiency).  
 139 See 42 USC § 2000e-2(k). See also Albemarle Paper Co v Moody, 422 US 405, 425 (1975) 
(holding that if an employer meets the burden of proving that certain employment tests are job-
related, the complaining party can still succeed if he can show that other selection devices, which 
do not have a similarly undesirable effect, would serve the employer’s legitimate interests). 
 140 Albemarle, 422 US at 425. 
 141 See Chambers v Omaha Girls Club, 629 F Supp 925, 948 (D Neb 1986).  
 142 Many cases turn on what counts as the relevant comparison group. See, for example, 
Caviale v State of Wisconsin, Department of Health & Social Services, 744 F2d 1289, 1294 (7th Cir 
1984) (overturning a district court ruling requiring the comparison pool to possess subjective 
qualities and instead limiting the comparison pool to those that possess the “minimum objective 
qualifications necessary”). Some circuits also require evidence of statistical significance to satisfy 
the prima facie case. See, for example, Fudge v City of Providence Fire Department, 766 F2d 650, 
658 (1st Cir 1985) (“[I]n cases involving a narrow data base, the better approach is for the courts 
to require a showing that the disparity is statistically significant.”). The Seventh Circuit allows for 
disparate impact so long as there is statistical significance even if the magnitude in difference in 
selection rates is quite small. See Bew v City of Chicago, 252 F3d 891, 893 (7th Cir 2001) (agree-
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defendant would then have the opportunity to “demonstrate that the 
challenged practice is job related for the position in question and con-
sistent with business necessity.”143 To return to our example, the restau-
rant might contend that weightlifting is an effective proxy to assess 
whether wait staff can carry trays stacked heavy with food and drinks.144  
Most importantly for our hypothetical employers, courts seem 
amenable to cost-based justifications for employment practices.145 While 
courts and scholars disagree over the contours of what constitutes “job 
related and consistent with business necessity,”146 many defendants 
                                                                                                                           
ing with the district court’s finding of disparate impact for a test in which 98.24 percent of blacks 
passed compared with 99.96 percent of whites). Some courts accept statistical evidence as well as 
other forms of proof to demonstrate disparate impact. See Thomas v Metroflight, Inc, 814 F2d 
1506, 1511 (10th Cir 1987) (holding that “statistical studies, evidence of experience in sufficiently 
similar circumstances, expert testimony on decisionmaking in the context of [the potentially 
discriminatory rule] or other evidence” can be used to prove disparate impact). Some courts also 
require substantiality of impact in addition to statistical significance. See id at 1511 n 4 (discuss-
ing cases in which the disparity of the impact must be both substantial as well as statistically signifi-
cant); Frazier v Garrison Independent School District, 980 F2d 1514, 1524 (5th Cir 1993) (stating 
that statistical disparities alone, without a demonstration of the magnitude of the disparity, are 
insufficient for satisfying a prima facie case of discrimination). 
 143 42 USC § 2000e-2(k)(1)(i). Congress formulated this text in response to Watson, in which a 
defendant could satisfy this standard by producing “evidence that its employment practices are 
based on legitimate business reasons,” see 487 US at 998, which Congress perceived as an overly 
defendant-friendly interpretation. See HR Rep 102-40, 102d Cong, 1st Sess (1991), reprinted in 1991 
USCCAN 549, 566–68. Congress, however, left this “job related and consistent with business neces-
sity” standard ambiguous. Lower courts must still grapple with pre-1991 precedents that appear 
to be in tension. For example, in cases like Beazer, in which the employer’s antimethadone policy 
was challenged, the Court articulated a relatively lenient standard, suggesting the employer’s 
legitimate goals need only be significantly served by their policy. See 440 US at 587 n 31. This was 
weaker than the suggestion in Dothard, where the Court seemed to require that the policy di-
rectly measure a characteristic essential to job performance. See 433 US at 331–32. 
 144 The plaintiff might counter that the alternative employment practice of having appli-
cants carry actual loaded trays is no more costly and as good or better at measuring the desired 
characteristic as well as having a less disparate impact on women. 
 145 See, for example, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission  v Francis W. Parker School, 
41 F3d 1073, 1078 (7th Cir 1994) (stating that the school’s policy of linking compensation to expe-
rience was “an economically defensible and reasonable means of determining salaries”); Finne-
gan v Trans World Airlines, Inc, 967 F2d 1161, 1163–65 (7th Cir 1992) (strongly implying that 
even if a disparate impact claim could be stated on a fringe benefits package, the cost savings 
would constitute a business justification); Robinson v Lorillard Corp, 444 F2d 791, 799 n 8 (4th 
Cir 1971) (stating that “considerations of economy and efficiency will often be relevant to de-
termining the existence of business necessity [but] dollar cost alone is not determinative”); Unit-
ed States v South Carolina, 445 F Supp 1094, 1116 (D SC 1977) (stating that a policy that caused a 
disparate impact survived the business necessity test inasmuch as there “appears to be no alter-
native available to the [employer] within reasonable limits of risk and cost”). 
 146 See, for example, Ian Ayres, Market Power and Inequality: A Competitive Conduct Stan-
dard for Assessing When Disparate Impacts Are Unjustified, 95 Cal L Rev 669, 671 (2007) (com-
paring arguments that the business necessity defense is only invalid when the employment policy 
is “needless” with arguments that the defense is only valid if the policy is substantially neces-
sary); Susan S. Grover, The Business Necessity Defense in Disparate Impact Discrimination Cases, 
30 Ga L Rev 387, 387–88 (1996) (arguing that the business necessity defense should require that 
the policy be essential to the continued viability of the business); Michael Carvin, Disparate 
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prevail under this defense. If the practice is unusual and not spread 
throughout the industry, an employer might face some difficulty show-
ing the practice is job-related and consistent with business necessity, 
but the threshold is relatively low. Moreover, many of our hypotheti-
cals rely on the employers’ efficiency gain in providing particular ben-
efits. Even so, some subset of hypothetical plaintiffs might prevail un-
der disparate impact analysis if courts engage in such analysis.  
The Supreme Court, however, has cast doubt as to whether fringe 
benefits and compensation packages are subject to disparate impact 
analysis.147 In Manhart, the pension case described above, the Court 
stated in dicta:  
The suggestion that a gender-neutral pension plan would itself 
violate Title VII because of its disproportionately heavy impact 
on male employees . . . has no force in the sex discrimination con-
text because each retiree’s total pension benefits are ultimately 
determined by his actual life span; any differential in benefits paid 
to men and women in the aggregate is thus “based on [a] factor 
other than sex” and consequently immune from challenge under 
the Equal Pay Act. Even under Title VII itself—assuming dispa-
rate impact analysis applies to fringe benefits—the male em-
ployees would not prevail. Even a completely neutral practice will 
inevitably have some disproportionate impact on one group or 
another. Griggs does not imply and this Court has never held that 
discrimination must always be inferred from such consequence.148 
This language poses several problems for passive discrimination 
cases. The Manhart dicta might be read to suggest that judges may never 
apply disparate impact analysis to wages or fringe benefits claims,149 
though another possible reading might merely indicate that disparate 
impact analysis is only available to minorities and not to men, or that 
                                                                                                                           
Impact Claims under the New Title VII, 68 Notre Dame L Rev 1153, 1157–58 (1993) (arguing that 
the language of the statute only requires that the policy be connected with or related to business 
necessity, rather than an essential method or the best means, and that it is therefore not a particular-
ly demanding standard). 
 147 Fringe benefits cases under disparate impact analysis have dealt with the exclusion of 
particular benefits, such as contraceptives or fertility treatments, rather than the decision to 
provide compensation in the form of fringe benefits. See, for example, Cooley v Daimler Chrysler 
Corp, 281 F Supp 2d 979, 986 (ED Mo 2003) (holding that female employees established a prima 
facie case of disparate impact due to the employer’s health plan not covering prescription contra-
ceptives). In the case of fringe benefits, “the plaintiff must offer statistical evidence of a kind and 
degree sufficient to show that the practice in question has caused the exclusion of applicants for 
jobs or promotions because of their membership in a protected group.” Rose v Wells Fargo & Co, 
902 F2d 1417, 1424 (9th Cir 1990), citing Watson, 487 US at 994. 
 148 Manhart, 435 US at 710 n 20. 
 149 See Douglas Laycock, Continuing Violations, Disparate Impact in Compensation, and Other 
Title VII Issues, 49 L & Contemp Probs 53, 54 (1986).
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where “disparate impact to one group results from avoiding disparate 
treatment of another, the practice is justified by a business necessity.”150 
Likely as a result of this language, few cases have grappled with 
compensation and fringe benefits under disparate impact analysis. In 
Finnegan v Trans World Airlines, Inc,151 the Seventh Circuit held that 
across-the-board cuts in fringe benefits, including reductions in vaca-
tion time and elimination of dental insurance, were not eligible for 
disparate impact analysis under the ADEA.152 Judge Richard Posner 
rejected even a prima facie case of disparate impact for “across-the-
board cuts in wages and fringe benefits necessitated by business 
downturns,” because “it would mean that every time an employer 
made an across-the-board cut in wages or benefits he was prima facie 
violating the age discrimination law. Practices so tenuously related to 
discrimination, so remote from the objectives of civil rights law, do not 
reach the prima facie threshold.”153 As Judge Posner explained, 
The concept of disparate impact was developed for the purpose of 
identifying discriminatory situations where, through inertia or in-
sensitivity, companies were following policies that gratuitously—
needlessly—although not necessarily deliberately, excluded black or 
female workers from equal employment opportunities . . . [whereas 
the policies here] are an unavoidable response to adversity.154 
Finnegan is distinguishable from most of the passive discrimination 
we discuss as it was both unintentional and was a response to economic 
pressures, rather than being the original design of the compensation 
package. It may also be distinguishable as an age case where compensa-
tion and benefits are very likely to be closely correlated with group 
membership, whereas not all compensation and fringe benefits are like-
ly to correlate with race or sex. Even so, Judge Posner emphasized the 
importance of “exclusion” from opportunity. But, as discussed below, 
passive discrimination does not exclude anyone from opportunity—it 
just makes the opportunity less desirable.  
Finnegan also raises another possible problem with including pas-
sive discrimination under disparate impact analysis. In dicta, Judge 
Posner suggested that judges lack the institutional competence to “re-
design corporate compensation packages.”155 He observed that “virtually 
                                                                                                                           
 150 Charles A. Sullivan, The World Turned Upside Down?: Disparate Impact Claims by White 
Males, 98 Nw U L Rev 1505, 1530 (2004). 
 151 967 F2d 1161 (7th Cir 1992). 
 152 Id at 1163 (holding that “changes in compensation, made in response to business adver-
sity” could not provide the basis of a disparate impact claim).  
 153 Id at 1164–65. 
 154 Id at 1164.  
 155 Finnegan, 967 F2d at 1165. 
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all elements of a standard compensation package are positively corre-
lated with age”156—similarly, as we noted in Part II, many preferences 
regarding compensation may also be positively correlated with group 
membership as defined by Title VII. Finally, Finnegan poses the problem 
that remedying disparate impact on one group may raise the specter of 
disparate treatment of another group. For instance, if women value 
pension policies more highly than men as they are likely to live longer, 
and if men could bring disparate impact claims, the court cannot remedy 
such violations by ordering the women to pay more into the insurance 
policy or to receive less pay. Given these arguments, disparate impact 
analysis may not be an applicable tool to redress passive discrimination. 
C. The Lack of Interest Defense 
The so-called “lack of interest defense,”157 available in both dispa-
rate treatment158 and disparate impact cases, is particularly relevant to 
the causation questions raised in potential passive discrimination cases. 
Lack of interest is a nondiscriminatory explanation for statistical dis-
parities159 and may be used to rebut the plaintiff’s prima facie case.160 
Under this “defense,” employers dispute the causal chain by showing 
that employees’ voluntary choices, rather than particular employment 
practices, cause workplace inequality or segregation. For example, in 
                                                                                                                           
 156 Id at 1164.  
 157 Many refer to the “lack of interest defense,” though defendants often deploy this argu-
ment not as a formal affirmative defense, but, as mentioned in the text, as a way to rebut the 
inference of causation raised by statistical disparity. 
 158 Courts have recognized the lack of interest defense as available even in pattern-and-
practice cases that rely on the inexorable zero. In Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v 
O & G Spring and Wire Forms Specialty Co, 38 F3d 872, 874 (7th Cir 1994), the EEOC sued a 
manufacturer for its failure to hire African-Americans. The trial court found that the inexorable 
zero in the company’s hiring decisions supported a prima facie case of hiring discrimination. The 
company argued that the lack of African-American hires could be explained by African-
Americans’ lack of interest in working in a place where Polish or Spanish was spoken. The appellate 
court rejected this formulation of the lack of interest argument, noting that such evidence would be 
relevant only if “African-Americans exhibited this propensity in significantly greater proportion to 
other native-born English speakers.” Id at 877. Only then could an employer defend an argument of 
self-selection bias on the part of African-Americans. Yet in our hypotheticals, the employer could 
argue in his defense that the individuals within the group do in fact exhibit the propensity that 
causes them to self-sort. 
 159 See, for example, Sears, 839 F2d at 313 (allowing the defendant to use a variety of evi-
dence, including external labor force data, national survey data, and data from surveys of store 
employees, to demonstrate that women are less interested in commission sales positions, thus rebut-
ting the presumption of discrimination given the disparities in hiring demonstrated by the EEOC’s 
statistical evidence). See also Catlett v Missouri Highway & Transportation Commission, 828 F2d 
1260, 1266 (8th Cir 1987) (explaining that the highway commission had not provided adequate 
evidence demonstrating that women have a lack of interest in highway maintenance work suffi-
cient to rebut the statistical disparities in the hiring of women).  
 160 See Teamsters, 431 US at 360 n 46. 
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Sears, the EEOC claimed that Sears “engaged in a nationwide pattern 
or practice of discrimination against women . . . by failing to hire and 
promote females into commission sales positions on the same basis as 
males.”161 Although the EEOC presented statistical evidence that Sears 
was significantly less likely to hire female applicants than male appli-
cants for commission sales, Sears rebutted the inference of discrimina-
tion by suggesting that female applicants themselves lacked interest in 
commission sales. The district court agreed and found that the company 
had merely honored the preexisting employment preferences of work-
ing women themselves.162 The appellate court accepted the reasons for 
women’s lack of interest in commission sales job, including “a fear or 
dislike of what they perceived as cut-throat competition, and increased 
pressure and risk associated with commission sales.”163 If the employer 
succeeds in showing that individual preference rather than a specific 
employment practice causes a disparate impact, then it need not even 
reach the question of whether the employment practice is job-related 
and consistent with business necessity.164 In addition, if the defendant 
need not reach this question, the plaintiffs lose the opportunity to prove 
that an equally effective, but less discriminatory, alternate employment 
practice should be utilized instead.165  
This lack of interest argument has been successful in both disparate 
treatment and disparate impact cases.166 Scholars have already recognized 
the problem the lack of interest doctrine poses for the structure of the 
                                                                                                                           
 161 839 F2d at 307. 
 162 Sears, 628 F Supp at 1324–25. See also Vicki Schultz and Stephen Patterson, Race, Gender, 
Work, and Choice: An Empirical Study of the Lack of Interest Defense in Title VII Cases Challenging 
Job Segregation, 59 U Chi L Rev 1073, 1077–78 (1992) (arguing that the validity of the lack of 
interest defense relied upon in Sears depends on the claim that women’s aversion to the position 
arose from social or cultural forces beyond the employer’s control). 
 163 Sears, 839 F2d at 320. The dissent criticized the majority for accepting such stereotypes, 
suggesting that something other than lack of interest must explain the statistical disparities: 
Women, as described by Sears, the district court, and the majority, exhibit the very same ste-
reotypical qualities for which they have been assigned low-status positions throughout his-
tory. . . . The stereotype of women as less greedy and daring than men is one that the sex 
discrimination laws were intended to address. . . . There are abundant indications that women 
lack neither the desire to compete strenuously for financial gain nor the capacity to take risks. 
Id at 361 (Cudahy dissenting). Interestingly, the EEOC brought the case as a disparate treatment 
case, rather than as a disparate impact case. This allowed the defendants to make the argument 
that the very structure of pay was the reason so few women ended up in commission sales. 
 164 42 USC § 2000e-2(k)(1)(B)(ii). 
 165 So, for example, if plaintiffs can show that a menu of compensation strategies would 
maintain the same level of sales while excluding fewer women, then the plaintiff can force the 
defendant to adopt such a practice. The lack of interest argument forecloses this path. 
 166 Some view it as part of a larger counterrevolution in employment discrimination law 
that reflects judges’ belief “that discrimination is not prevalent in today’s workplace.” Ann 
McGinley, !Viva La Evolución!: Recognizing Unconscious Motive in Title VII, 9 Cornell J L & 
Pub Policy 415, 471 (2000). 
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labor process and for organizational form.167 Vicki Schultz and Stephen 
Patterson suggest that courts often “credit the lack of interest defense 
in sex discrimination cases,” as they “have assumed that women’s work 
aspirations and identities are shaped exclusively through early socializa-
tion or even innate predispositions, rather than in response to labor 
market conditions.”168 Over time, courts have also “begun to rationalize 
racial inequality in employment as the reflection of racial differences in 
work preferences that are not rooted in larger labor market conditions.”169 
While Schultz and Patterson suggest that many work-related prefe-
rences are endogenous to the labor market, it may also be that employers 
intentionally or unintentionally act upon those compensation and fringe 
benefits preferences that are exogenous to the labor market. This Ar-
ticle suggests that labor market conditions that shape women’s and oth-
er minorities’ interests in particular jobs may include not only the mere 
job descriptions and duties, but also the terms, conditions, and privileges 
of employment and the structure of compensation. Yet employers and 
courts seem to, with few exceptions, view these packages as within the 
employers’ discretion to design and the employees’ discretion to take or 
leave. Passive discrimination suggests that courts’ acceptance of such 
preferences under the lack of interest doctrine may open the door for 
the employer to use such preferences with impunity.  
D. Nondoctrinal Limits on Title VII 
As discussed, many forms of passive discrimination escape both 
existing disparate impact and disparate treatment models. Even if 
courts recognized passive discrimination as actionable under Title VII 
and plaintiffs could satisfy the prima facie case, defendants seem likely 
to use lack of interest to prevent recovery. We further observe that 
should courts revisit and expand these doctrines, other barriers en-
demic to Title VII provide substantial hurdles for passive discrimina-
tion suits. This Part briefly overviews the substantial limits to a litiga-
                                                                                                                           
 167 Mark Gould, Law and Philosophy: Some Consequences for the Law Deriving from the 
Sociological Reconstruction of Philosophical Theory, 17 Cardozo L Rev 1239, 1357 (1996): 
[A]n organizational form may have a disparate impact on economically homogenous black 
and white workers, and when it does, that organizational form should be subject to legal sanc-
tion. Disparate impact theory should not only be reinstated as a check on facially neutral 
hiring practices that actually discriminate, it should be extended to include facially neutral 
organizational forms that discriminate. 
But see Neil Dishman, Defending the Lack of Interest Defense: Why Title VII Should Recognize 
Differing Job Interests between the Sexes, 14 Geo Mason U Civ Rts L J 189, 214–15 (2004). 
 168 Schultz and Patterson, 59 U Chi L Rev at 1081 (cited in note 162). 
 169 Id at 1082. 
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tion-based strategy in: (1) perceiving discrimination, (2) reporting dis-
crimination, and (3) winning suits. 
1. Perceiving discrimination. 
Many people fail even to recognize employment discrimination 
because few members of disfavored groups consciously acknowledge 
“the illegitimacy of their disadvantaged position in the status system.”170 
Many individuals resist recognizing the existence of pervasively unfair 
group-based outcomes, as doing so would challenge the widely held and 
deep-seated belief that the world is just and that outcomes are based on 
personal control, meritocracies, and fairness.171 That being said, some 
individuals reject the belief in a just world and may instead accurately 
perceive discrimination or even see discrimination where either none 
exists or it is not legally cognizable. Some theorists contend that 
members of low-status groups may be more susceptible to this vigil-
ance bias “because of their more frequent encounters with prejudice.”172 
Limited empirical evidence, however, suggests that the tendency among 
individuals to overlook or minimize discrimination (“minimization 
bias”) is more prevalent than the vigilance bias.173 
Even for those individuals who perceive workplace discrimina-
tion, passive discrimination is particularly likely to be invisible. Recent 
studies suggest that those workers who feel discriminated against tend 
to identify the source as either harassing behavior or subjective deci-
sionmaking systems that result in a wage differential.174 For instance, 
self-reporting studies show that individuals complain most about be-
ing passed over for promotion, being assigned undesirable tasks, and 
hearing racist comments.175 The form of discrimination outlined in this 
Article, however, facially treats employees the same. While individuals 
within protected classes may place different values on the compensa-
tion packages, employers do not formally exclude individuals from 
                                                                                                                           
 170 Cheryl R. Kaiser and Brenda Major, A Social Psychological Perspective on Perceiving 
and Reporting Discrimination, 31 L & Soc Inquiry 801, 804 (2006).  
 171 Id at 804–06 (reviewing a number of studies supporting the proposition that people 
often do not see or minimize discrimination when it is directed at them).  
 172 Brenda Major, et al, Perceiving Personal Discrimination: The Role of Group Status and 
Legitimizing Ideology, 82 J Personality & Soc Psych 269, 270, 280 (2002). 
 173 See id at 270. See also Russell K. Robinson, Perceptual Segregation, 108 Colum L Rev 
1093, 1142 (2008) (suggesting that the weight of empirical evidence is in favor of the minimiza-
tion bias, and that the tendency is to underestimate discrimination).  
 174 Tristin K. Green, Targeting Workplace Context: Title VII As a Tool for Institutional 
Reform, 72 Fordham L Rev 659, 683–87 (2003).  
 175 K.A. Dixon, Duke Storen, and Carl E. Van Horn, A Workplace Divided: How Americans View 
Discrimination and Race on the Job 14 (Rutgers, Jan 2002), online at http://www.heldrich.rutgers.edu/ 
uploadedFiles/Publications/Work_Trends_020107.pdf (visited Apr 14, 2009).  
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these terms. Potential plaintiffs have a difficult enough time recogniz-
ing disparate treatment in hiring, much less identifying the ways in 
which facially neutral wage structures and fringe benefit packages 
have been organized in order to encourage them to opt out of it.176 
Passive discrimination may successfully encourage potential em-
ployees to sort themselves out of jobs, but those individuals seem 
much more likely to view such sorting as evidence of personal agency 
and control rather than perceiving it as discriminatory. This is particu-
larly true when employers act like our hypothesized litigation-savvy 
employers who engage in no other discriminatory behavior. 
Much of the potential discrimination discussed in this Article is 
quite subtle and can remain invisible as part of the established status 
quo. For example, despite the fact that insurance plans have long failed 
to cover contraceptives, women did not begin challenging this coverage 
gap until 2000.177 Similarly, individuals seem unlikely to perceive gener-
ous pension packages, Sundays off, free tuition, or commission-based 
wages as discriminatory rather than part of the established workplace 
and the existing world. That being said, individuals have challenged 
English-only workplaces—perhaps because these policies seem to 
more clearly exclude some employees (who cannot speak English or 
desire to speak a second language) or because they often reflect a 
change in the employers’ policies, which had previously allowed other 
languages.178 So, the perception barrier is not an insurmountable one, 
but it suggests cutting-edge litigation may be slow in coming.  
2. Reporting discrimination. 
For whatever small percentage of applicants and employees who 
do perceive discrimination, even fewer individuals act upon such intui-
tions to pursue litigation or other remedies. As we posit, passive dis-
crimination presumably dissuades many individuals from even accept-
ing employment. The employer has not refused to offer them em-
                                                                                                                           
 176 See Ian Ayres and Peter Siegelman, The Q-word As Red Herring: Why Disparate Impact 
Liability Does Not Induce Hiring Quotas, 74 Tex L Rev 1487, 1492 (1996) (discussing how the use 
of subjective hiring standards and the requirement that hiring statistics be based on the qualified 
population in the relevant job market has made it increasingly difficult for plaintiffs to recognize 
or prove that disparate treatment in hiring has occurred).  
 177 As Kathryn Kolbert, cofounder of the Center for Reproductive Law and Policy noted, 
“[The exclusion of contraceptive coverage] is a problem that is so obvious it got hidden. Because 
women were denied coverage for so long, no one ever questioned it.” Debra Baker, Viagra 
Spawns Birth Control Issue: Advocates Invoke Bias Laws in Urging Insurance Coverage of Con-
traceptives, 84 ABA J 36, 36 (Aug 1998) (reporting an interview with Kathryn Kolbert). 
 178 See, for example, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v Premier Operator Servic-
es, Inc, 113 F Supp 2d 1066, 1073 (ND Tex 2000) (holding that an employer’s blanket prohibition on 
the speaking of a language other than English on the employer’s premises violated Title VII).  
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ployment but, rather, has selected terms and conditions of employ-
ment that make the job less desirable to individuals of particular pro-
tected classes. If such discrimination poses a cognizable claim and the 
individuals perceive it as such, they could choose to file directly with 
the EEOC. Many potential plaintiffs, however, lack the resources to 
pursue a claim,179 and many of those who are hunting for jobs seem 
especially vulnerable in this respect. Such resource constraints may 
explain why plaintiffs are also less likely to pursue disparate impact 
claims, which, unlike disparate treatment claims, do not provide for 
damages.180 Most disparate impact cases tend to deal with employment 
tests, with few novel claims advanced.181 
For those individuals who wish to challenge these terms and condi-
tions after they have already been employed, most must use internal 
grievance mechanisms before they can file a complaint with the EEOC. 
So those few who are not “efficiently” sorted out of the segregated 
workplace will have to take any ensuing dispute to the internal griev-
ance system. These internal mechanisms tend to construe problems as 
misunderstandings rather than as legal grievances.182 Not surprisingly, 
for those individuals already in an employment situation, most decide 
not to seek either internal or external remedies.183  
                                                                                                                           
 179 See Barbara A. Curran, The Legal Needs of the Public: The Final Report of a National 
Survey, 141–42, 262 (American Bar Foundation 1977) (reporting that people facing job discrimi-
nation problems are the least likely to have access to available resources, such as government 
agencies, and have the lowest rate of lawyer use). Some evidence also suggests that employees 
may be less likely to file suit in periods of economic strength. See, for example, John J. Donohue 
and Peter Siegelman, Law and Macroeconomics: Employment Discrimination Litigation over the 
Business Cycle, 66 S Cal L Rev 709, 710 (1993) (suggesting that in times of prosperity, potential 
litigants are more likely to bypass their legal remedies when new jobs and market opportunities 
are available). 
 180 See 42 USC § 1981a(a)(1) (providing for compensatory and punitive damages in inten-
tional discrimination cases). That being said, Michael Selmi suggests that “many of the recent 
large class action claims have proceeded under an intentional discrimination theory, even though 
many of their core allegations sound in traditional disparate impact language.” Selmi, 53 UCLA 
L Rev at 735 n 142 (cited in note 135).  
 181 Selmi, 53 UCLA L Rev at 742–43 (cited in note 135). 
 182 See Lauren B. Edelman, Christopher Uggen, and Howard S. Erlanger, The Endogeneity 
of Legal Regulation: Grievance Procedures As Rational Myth, 105 Am J Sociology 406, 449 (1999) 
(discussing the manner in which internal grievance systems approach claims as managerial prob-
lems, rather than as an issue of the legal rights of the employee). 
 183 Kaiser, 31 L & Soc Inquiry at 813–14 (cited in note 170). A Rutgers study suggests that 
about 34 percent of those believing they suffered unfair treatment did nothing, with at best 
3 percent initiating a lawsuit. See Dixon, A Workplace Divided at 15 (cited in note 175). 
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3. Winning suits. 
Of all discrimination cases brought to the EEOC, plaintiffs re-
ceive favorable decisions in only 28 percent of the claims.184 Of those 
victorious in lower courts, many employment discrimination plaintiffs 
have their victories overturned at the appellate level, while defendants 
are likely to preserve their lower court victories.185 Of all employment 
discrimination plaintiffs, those claiming either race or sex discrimina-
tion (excepting harassment cases) fare particularly badly.186 Victims 
hardly fare better in internal complaint systems.187  
In disparate treatment and disparate impact cases, plaintiffs are 
both far more likely to file and to win firing cases than hiring cases.188 
Firing, rather than hiring, cases are more common because in dispa-
rate impact firing claims “the relevant pools exist within the firm (a 
greater fraction of black than white employees were terminated), 
whereas in a hiring case great debate concerns the appropriate deter-
mination of the qualified applicant pool.”189 These disparate impact 
cases are generally difficult to win—in 2002, only 13 percent of plain-
tiffs prevailed at the district court level with disparate impact claims.190 
Several factors might explain such poor results as compared to 
most civil litigation.191 Judges and juries “may falsely assume that mem-
                                                                                                                           
 184 See Laura Beth Nielsen and Robert L. Nelson, Scaling the Pyramid: A Sociolegal Model of 
Employment Discrimination Litigation, in Laura Beth Nielsen and Robert L. Nelson, eds, Hand-
book of Employment Discrimination Research: Rights and Realities 3, 31 (Springer 2005) (reporting 
that of all the favorable decisions, 99 percent are from EEOC action and settlement and 1 percent 
from litigated trial victory). 
 185 See Kevin M. Clermont, Theodore Eisenberg, and Stewart Schwab, How Employment-
discrimination Plaintiffs Fare in the Federal Courts of Appeals, 7 Empl Rts & Empl Policy J 547, 
552 (2003) (finding that despite the fact that plaintiffs appeal at a rate fifteen times greater than 
defendants, plaintiffs obtain one-quarter the number of reversals that defendants do). 
 186 See David Benjamin Oppenheimer, Verdicts Matter: An Empirical Study of California 
Employment Discrimination and Wrongful Discharge Jury Verdicts Reveal Low Success Rates for 
Women and Minorities, 37 UC Davis L Rev 511, 516–17 (2003) (analyzing jury verdicts in California 
employment law cases and concluding that judicial and juror bias substantially disadvantages 
women and minorities in employment discrimination cases). 
 187 See Lauren B. Edelman, Howard S. Erlanger, and John Lande, Internal Dispute Resolution: 
The Transformation of Civil Rights in the Workplace, 27 L & Socy Rev 497, 529–30 (1993). 
 188 See John J. Donohue III and Peter Siegelman, The Changing Nature of Employment 
Discrimination Litigation, 43 Stan L Rev 983, 1015 (1991) (analyzing the increased use of antidi-
scrimination suits to protect the existing positions of workers, rather than to open employment 
opportunities for disadvantaged groups); Selmi, 53 UCLA L Rev at 739 (cited in note 135). 
 189 Stewart J. Schwab, Employment Discrimination, in Boudewijn Bouckaert and Gerrit De 
Geest, eds, 3 Encyclopedia of Law and Economics 583 (Edward Elgar 2000). See also, for exam-
ple, Wards Cove Packing Co v Atonio, 490 US 642, 650–51 (1989). 
 190 Selmi, 53 UCLA L Rev at 739 (cited in note 135). 
 191 That being said, many employment discrimination suits settle, and the number may be 
higher than most data reflects, as increasing numbers of invisible settlements are not recorded in 
the docket. Nonetheless, employment discrimination suits settle at a substantially lower rate than 
other types of civil actions. See Eric Conn, Note, Hanging in the Balance: Confidentiality Clauses 
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bers of a protected class err on the side of vigilance.”192 They overlook or 
underestimate “the significant social costs entailed in bringing a dis-
crimination claim.”193 If a single person or a few individuals bring the 
action, judges and juries may “wonder why other group members have 
not stepped forward to bring similar charges against the employer” and 
presume those who brought the suit are troublemakers.194 David Op-
penheimer suggests that “jury pools, already affected by race and gend-
er bias, are being unduly influenced by incorrect information about the 
civil justice system and employment discrimination law” such as the 
misperception that minorities are routinely winning meritless cases.195 
Similarly, Michael Selmi contends that most judges believe the “role 
discrimination plays in contemporary America has been sharply dimi-
nished, and those who take this view are reluctant to find discrimina-
tion absent compelling evidence.”196 This empirical evidence suggests 
that even if existing doctrine prohibits passive discrimination, plain-
tiffs are unlikely to successfully combat it through litigation. 
IV.  POTENTIAL SOLUTIONS 
This Article fits within a larger debate about the appropriate 
framework with which to address workplace discrimination and segre-
gation. Even for those generally sanguine about the market’s ability to 
price out discrimination, a perfectly functioning market will not elimi-
nate the problems identified in this Article. As discussed in Part I, in-
tentional passive discriminators, unlike less savvy market actors, can 
achieve a segregating equilibrium. Even those employers that possess 
no discriminatory animus and respond rationally to market pressure 
                                                                                                                           
and Postjudgment Settlements of Employment Discrimination Disputes, 86 Va L Rev 1537, 1538 n 6 
(2000) (comparing the tort settlement rate of 74 percent and the employment discrimination 
settlement rate ranging from 61.3 percent to 67.7 percent). There has been no significant increase 
in reported settlements after the statutory amendments to Title VII that took place in 1991. See 
Michael Selmi, Why Are Employment Discrimination Cases So Hard to Win?, 61 La L Rev 555, 
570 n 58 (2001). See also generally Minna J. Kotkin, Invisible Settlements, Invisible Discrimina-
tion, 84 NC L Rev 927, 929 (2006) (arguing that confidential settlement agreements make em-
ployment discrimination invisible and reduce the deterrent effect of discrimination statutes). 
While the number of settlements might mean the data fails to pick up some remedies, such set-
tlements further stoke judges’ beliefs that “most plaintiffs are whiners and complainers” as the 
favorable outcomes “are shielded from judicial imprimatur.” Id at 932. 
 192 Kaiser, 31 L & Soc Inquiry at 824 (cited in note 170). 
 193 Id.  
 194 Id at 824–25. 
 195 Oppenheimer, 37 UC Davis L Rev at 562 (cited in note 186). See also Selmi, 61 La L 
Rev at 557 (cited in note 191) (decrying the general consensus that employment discrimination 
cases are all too easy to win, which the author argues is fueled by popular books dramatizing the 
damage done by employment discrimination suits).  
 196 Selmi, 61 La L Rev at 563 (cited in note 191). 
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to eliminate irrational and inefficient discrimination face little incen-
tive to eliminate unintentional passive discrimination.197  
If one were concerned about either the workplace segregation 
created by passive discrimination or the disregard for group-based pre-
ferences for particular compensation structures and fringe benefits, 
some judicial and legislative actions might be taken to reduce these 
phenomena.198 Title VII reform provides one obvious approach. That 
being said, scholars disagree as to whether Title VII can effectively ad-
dress the organizational structures and workplace norms that foster 
discriminatory outcomes and segregated workplaces.199 Some contend 
that Title VII has made major gains200 and with a little guidance can con-
tinue to do so in new contexts.201 As discussed in Part III, however, much 
social psychology literature suggests that reliance on individual clai-
mants to recognize, report, and litigate discrimination has significant 
limitations.202 While Title VII has certainly caused many businesses to 
be increasingly careful about their hiring and firing practices, scholars 
have not resolved the degree to which Title VII should be credited 
with reducing workplace discrimination and changing public opinion 
in favor of integrated workplaces.  
Rather than attempt to resolve this debate, we merely suggest 
possible solutions within Title VII’s litigation-based framework as well 
                                                                                                                           
 197 See Green, 72 Fordham L Rev at 673 (cited in note 174) (noting that the “entrenched, 
taken-for-granted nature of institutionally enabled discrimination renders it particularly resistant 
to market-induced reform”). 
 198 Of course, no such changes might be needed if cases of intentional passive discrimina-
tion are rare or adequately captured by pattern-and-practice claims and one is unconcerned with 
both unintentionally induced workplace segregation and group-based differences in perceived or 
actual compensation and fringe benefits so long as no individual discrimination exists. As ex-
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employees or an otherwise less desirable job. 
 199 See Michelle A. Travis, Recapturing the Transformative Potential of Employment Dis-
crimination Law, 62 Wash & Lee L Rev 3, 7–8 nn 15–16 (2005) (detailing numerous articles that 
criticize the impact of antidiscrimination law and numerous articles that suggest future uses of 
employment discrimination law to restructure the workplace). 
 200 See, for example, James J. Heckman and Brook S. Payner, Determining the Impact of Feder-
al Antidiscrimination Policy on the Economic Status of Blacks: A Study of South Carolina, 79 Am 
Econ Rev 138, 173–74 (1989) (concluding that federal antidiscrimination policy was responsible for 
the increased employment and higher relative wages for blacks in the South Carolina manufac-
turing industry). 
 201 See Michael Zimmer, Systemic Empathy, 34 Colum Hum Rts L Rev 575, 603 (2003) (“A 
mini–Civil Rights Movement in the courts—undertaking more systemic cases and using exper-
tise to help draw the inference of discrimination—may prove useful for developing a more em-
pathetic federal judiciary.”). 
 202 See, for example, Kaiser and Major, 31 L & Soc Inquiry at 824 (cited in note 170) (dis-
cussing the cognitive and motivational barriers that hamper individual litigants from effectively 
using the legal system to pursue antidiscrimination claims). 
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as present some more innovative approaches. These options include 
standalone legislation, education initiatives, and incentivized employer 
restructuring. We offer preliminary suggestions but do so cognizant of 
the risks of unexpected and perverse outcomes. We encourage other 
scholars to think systematically about the prevention of and possible 
remedies for passive discrimination. 
A. Litigation Strategies 
1. Title VII expansion. 
One possible strategy, favored in other contexts by many legal aca-
demics, involves the legislative or judicial expansion of disparate impact 
litigation.203 To begin with, courts could apply disparate impact doctrine 
to the structure of compensation and to the provision of fringe benefits. 
In so doing, they would need to clarify the dicta in Manhart and nar-
rowly construe or abandon the Seventh Circuit’s holding in Finnegan as 
applied to Title VII. When evaluating compensation packages and other 
fringe benefits, they would have to decide the role of statistics and sub-
jectivity in determining how to value the packages and when different 
group valuations rise to the level of disparate impact. As mentioned 
above, such assessments can be difficult for courts, but they already do 
much statistical work in assessing conventional disparate impact and 
pattern-and-practice claims. Such expansion would address both inten-
tional and unintentional passive discrimination cases. 
As briefly mentioned above, the judiciary may greet attempts to 
expand the scope of disparate impact suits or to limit the potential de-
fenses with skepticism and hostility. Courts have tended to interpret 
Title VII in a stingy manner,204 have been reluctant to expand Title VII,205 
and in recent years have retrenched as to “what constitutes an actiona-
ble employment discrimination claim.”206 They have resisted efforts to 
                                                                                                                           
 203 See, for example, Selmi, 53 UCLA L Rev at 704 n 12 (cited in note 135) (listing numerous 
articles proposing such reforms); Charles Sullivan, Re-reviving Disparate Impact *59–60 (Seton Hall 
Public Law Research Paper No 9, Aug 2004), online at http://ssrn.com/abstract=581503 (visited Apr 14, 
2009); Laura Beth Nielsen and Robert L. Nelson, Rights Realized? An Empirical Analysis of Employ-
ment Discrimination Litigation As a Claiming System, 2005 Wis L Rev 663, 708 (arguing that expand-
ing the application of disparate impact theories could significantly reduce employment inequality).  
 204 See Zimmer, 34 Colum Hum Rts L Rev at 586–93 (cited in note 201) (concluding after a 
review of cases and academic studies that judges are inherently unsympathetic to discrimination cas-
es); Melissa Hart, Subjective Decisionmaking and Unconscious Discrimination, 56 Ala L Rev 741, 789 
(2005) (arguing that plaintiffs face strong judicial resistance to a finding of illegal discrimination).  
 205 See Sullivan, 98 Nw U L Rev at 1565 (cited in note 150) (discussing judicial doctrines 
that have limited, rather than expanded, the scope of Title VII).  
 206 Nielsen, 2005 Wis L Rev at 673 (cited in note 203). 
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characterize default arrangements and organizational structures as 
particular employment practices open to challenge.207  
The possibility of judicial backlash or legislative rollback is even 
more worrisome than the mere prospect of judicial hostility. Attempts 
to expand Title VII to cover heterogeneous preferences or to narrow 
disparate impact defenses could simultaneously encourage courts to 
restrict Title VII through other means such as raising the standards for 
statistical evidence, or making prima facie claims harder to establish. 
Such a strategy of giving in on substance and taking away on proce-
dure may ultimately hurt more than it helps. Similarly, congressional 
expansion of Title VII may facilitate a legislative rollback.208 Just as 
courts can undo protections when faced with litigation they view with 
a skeptical eye, Congress can do even more by changing the actual 
text of Title VII. For example, the Civil Rights Act of 1991209 was a 
mixed set of pro-plaintiff and pro-defendant policies.210 
Even so, allowing disparate impact suits in this area may yield 
some benefits. In addition to the prospect of successful plaintiffs (either 
through litigated triumphs or settlements), merely forcing workplaces 
to elucidate a business necessity justification may itself change some 
exclusionary practices.211 Making compensation and fringe benefits sus-
ceptible to disparate impact analysis might denaturalize these practices, 
which itself may encourage voluntary change.212 So those risk-averse em-
ployers who unintentionally engage in passive discrimination and those 
who face low costs in changing the policies may do so once made aware 
of the practices’ potential illegality. Litigation and doctrinal adjustments 
may also influence front-end behavior for new employers or those inde-
pendently considering new compensation and fringe benefit packages.  
                                                                                                                           
 207 Travis, 62 Wash & Lee L Rev at 39–40 (cited in note 199). 
 208 See Bernice Sandler, Publicly-supported Single Sex Schools and Policy Issues, 14 NY L 
Sch J Hum Rts 61, 66 (1997) (arguing that experience has demonstrated that opening any con-
troversial statute for amendment often leads to restrictions in the statute’s impact). Consider 
also Howard Eglit, The Age Discrimination in Employment Act, Title VII, and the Civil Rights Act 
of 1991: Three Acts and a Dog That Didn’t Bark, 39 Wayne L Rev 1093, 1101–06 (1993) (discuss-
ing the consequences of the enactment of the Civil Rights Act of 1991, which significantly 
amended Title VII, and its effects on the Age Discrimination in Employment Act).  
 209 Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub L No 102-166, 105 Stat 1071, codified as amended at 42 
USC § 2000e et seq. 
 210 By opening up Title VII, proponents were able to undo some of the defendant-friendly, 
post-Griggs litigation but also allowed the addition of some pro-defendant changes. Similarly, 
revisiting Title VII to debate the scope of disparate impact litigation could allow other amend-
ments that could be net losers for plaintiffs. See note 208. 
 211 See Kenji Yoshino, Covering: The Hidden Assault on Our Civil Rights 135–36, 178–79 
(Random House 2007) (discussing the power of the business justification rule in propelling “reason-
forcing” conversations regarding policies that may have a discriminatory impact on certain groups).  
 212 See Michelle A. Travis, Equality in the Virtual Workplace, 24 Berkeley J Empl & Labor L 
283, 375 (2003) (discussing the feminist interest in denaturalizing workplace structures). 
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2. Standalone legislation. 
As individual compensation packages and other terms and condi-
tions of employment become more salient, interest groups may in-
stead push for standalone legislation to address particular mechanisms 
of passive discrimination. Such an approach avoids the pitfalls of 
opening up Title VII to amendment.213 Independent legislation may also 
bypass some of the litigation hurdles associated with Title VII if it 
does not primarily rely on individual claimants for enforcement. Of 
course, this sort of case-by-case approach fails to provide comprehen-
sive protection against a determined employer. 
For instance, one piece of model legislation which might be taken 
as a response to passive discrimination,214 the Equity in Prescription 
Insurance and Contraceptive Coverage Act (EPICC), targeted insur-
ance providers rather than employers.215 The bill “require[d] all private 
insurance plans that provide prescription drug coverage to include pre-
scription contraceptive coverage.”216 As Congress allowed this bill to 
languish for several years, state-by-state legislation may present a 
more viable option. So far, at least thirty-three states have regulated 
insurance coverage relating to contraceptives either by requiring poli-
cies that cover prescription drugs to also cover contraceptives or by 
prohibiting health plans from excluding contraceptive services or sup-
plies.217 One such state, Illinois, has also undertaken an awareness cam-
paign to educate the public about mandatory contraceptive coverage.218 
When fringe benefits or compensation packages are facially neutral but 
exclude something of high value to most individuals within a particular 
group, legislative intervention can remedy such exclusion.   
                                                                                                                           
 213 For instance, concern about legislative rollback is one reason advocates drafted the Ameri-
cans with Disabilities Act (ADA) rather than amend Title VII. See Brian K. Esser, Comment, Beyond 
43 Million: The “Regarded As” Prong of the ADA and HIV Infection—A Tautological Approach, 49 
Am U L Rev 471, 476 (2000); Robert L. Burgdorf, Jr, The Americans with Disabilities Act: Analysis 
and Implications of a Second-generation Civil Rights Statute, 26 Harv CR–CL L Rev 413, 429 (1991). 
 214 This is not a perfect fit as the lack of contraceptive coverage seems an unlikely mechan-
ism to exclude either women or nonreligious employees from a particular employer or from the 
general workforce. It is a good example, however, of a policy relating to fringe benefits where 
employers may simply have not considered women’s interests. 
 215 See S 104, 107th Cong, 1st Sess, in 147 Cong Rec S 97 (Jan 22, 2001); HR 1111, 107th 
Cong, 1st Sess, in 147 Cong Rec H 1010 (Mar 20, 2001). 
 216 National Women’s Law Center, Contraceptive Coverage: A Multi-track Approach 2 (May 
2008), online at http://www.nwlc.org/pdf/Contraceptive%20Coverage%20MultiTrack%20Approach% 
20May%20200.pdf (visited Apr 14, 2009).  
 217 See The Henry J. Kaiser Family Foundation, State Mandated Benefits: Contraceptives, As of 
August 1, 2007, online at http://www.statehealthfacts.org/comparetable.jsp?ind=487&cat=10&print=1 
(visited Apr 14, 2009) (listing the states that mandate that insurance providers cover contraceptives).  
 218 See Planned Parenthood Action Illinois, Planned Parenthood, Governor Blagojevich An-
nounce Contraceptive Insurance Awareness Campaign (2004), online at http://www.ppaction.org/ 
ppil/pp_gov_mktg.html (visited Apr 14, 2009).  
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Other issues relating to terms and conditions of employment and 
compensation packages that are identified in this Article seem more 
resistant to tailored legislative fixes.219 If only a few employers engage 
in particular screening behavior, interest groups may not prioritize 
addressing such behavior since it will only directly affect a limited 
number of individuals. In addition, some of the mechanisms of passive 
discrimination provide a benefit that many individuals highly value 
(though not those sorted out), rather than deny a benefit that few val-
ue very highly (while those that are sorted out do not). Other mechan-
isms provide a benefit that is highly valued by a small number of indi-
viduals, but given their intense preferences, those individuals would 
strenuously oppose any legislation to eliminate the benefit. For in-
stance, interest groups seem extremely unlikely to muster the political 
will to eliminate “Sundays off” policies.220  
The ultimate success of either Title VII expansion or standalone leg-
islation may depend on the reasons for the underlying discrimination. If 
employers sort out individuals with a protected characteristic because of 
inadvertence or expense, blanket prohibitions should be satisfactory in 
eliminating the exclusionary practice. Such action would bring the be-
havior to the employers’ attention and raise the specter of litigation 
costs. On the other hand, if employers use compensation and other 
terms, conditions, and privileges of employment as a sophisticated me-
chanism for intentional discrimination or as a proxy for some other de-
sired characteristic, then targeted litigation and legislative approaches 
may just encourage employers to devise a new sorting mechanism. For 
instance, some employers might have used tests and college degrees as 
an imperfect proxy to screen out African-Americans in the 1960s and 
1970s. The advent of disparate impact legislation means that similarly 
animus-laden employers may now use low-wage, high-pension strate-
gies to screen out African-Americans. If passive discrimination is sanc-
tionable behavior, determined employers may seek another imperfect 
                                                                                                                           
 219 For instance, language policies may pose serious challenges to an easy legislative fix. 
Many of those most affected by “English-only” policies lack legislative clout and many states 
face pressure from English-only movements. That being said, at least one state (California) has 
prohibited English-only policies under state fair employment and housing department regula-
tions as well as through statewide legislation. See Cal Gov Code § 12951 (West). 
 220 Even if such a constituency existed, such a policy would raise serious religious accommoda-
tion issues for employers, and many states still have blue laws prohibiting the operation of particu-
lar businesses on Sundays. See McGowan v Maryland, 366 US 420, 444–52 (1961) (holding that 
Maryland’s blue laws promote the secular values of “health, safety, recreation, and general well-
being” and thus violate neither the Free Exercise Clause nor the Establishment Clause); Maarten 
Goos, Sinking the Blues: The Impact of Shop Closing Hours on Labor and Product Markets *2 
(CEP Discussion Paper No 664, Dec 2004), online at http://cep.lse.ac.uk/pubs/download/dp0664.pdf 
(visited Apr 14, 2009) (noting that as of 1997, at least eight states still had Sunday closing laws). 
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but legal screening strategy.221 Of course, even forcing them to abandon 
the existing approach and to find a new, litigation-proof approach raises 
the employers’ costs. 
B. Nonlitigation Strategies  
In addition to legal efforts, nonlegal and voluntary strategies might 
also help address problems raised by passive discrimination. They might 
serve either as a complement to legal sanctions or as an alternate option 
if legal sanctions are unavailable. We briefly discuss education-based 
strategies as well as various methods to incentivize employers to change 
their behavior. Yet some of the most effective remedies we consider 
raise other problems and unintended consequences that warrant se-
rious consideration.  
1. Raising awareness.  
If courts and legislatures fail to reach the question of when fringe 
benefits and other compensation structures are subject to challenge 
under disparate impact analysis, the EEOC could issue nonbinding advi-
sory guidelines on the subject. These guidelines could identify areas in 
which existing employer behavior to screen for a particular characteristic 
or longstanding wage and compensation structures disadvantage par-
ticular groups. In so doing, the EEOC might suggest alternative, clearly 
compliant structures, such as those discussed below. By merely raising 
the issue, unintentional passive discriminators could be alerted to the 
effects of their practices. If inadvertent or unconscious bias drives most 
of these practices, simple education might go a long way. As Professor 
Tristin Green notes, “[S]ociologists have explained that the racial or 
gendered character of taken-for-granted institutionalized practices is 
often rendered invisible to current incumbents of organizational posi-
tions.”222 Those workplaces interested in enhancing diversity might re-
structure such invisible barriers to workplace integration.223 
                                                                                                                           
 221 See Ayres and Siegelman, 74 Tex L Rev at 1491–93 (cited in note 176) (discussing how 
the rise of disparate impact liability induced employers to shift from objective tests to less trans-
parent subjective evaluation metrics in order to eliminate individuals from disfavored groups). 
 222 Green, 72 Fordham L Rev at 670 (cited in note 197).  
 223 Yet just as litigation strategies have limits, so too do education strategies. For example, 
following the guidance of human resource departments and lawyers, many companies have 
adopted harassment and diversity training programs to avoid litigation. As Professor Bisom-
Rapp notes, however, very little evidence supports the effectiveness of sexual harassment train-
ing. See Susan Bisom-Rapp, Fixing Watches with Sledgehammers: The Questionable Embrace of 
Employee Sexual Harassment Training by the Legal Profession, 24 U Ark Little Rock L Rev 147, 
162–65 (2001); Susan Bisom-Rapp, An Ounce of Prevention Is a Poor Substitute for a Pound of 
Cure: Confronting the Developing Jurisprudence of Education and Prevention in Employment Dis-
crimination Law, 22 Berkeley J Empl & Labor L 1, 4–5 (2001). 
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While such guidelines often receive little deference from courts,224 
they may still influence intentional but risk-averse passive discriminators. 
If they send a signal of possible liability, even if a very speculative sig-
nal, employers and human resource managers take notice. As sociolo-
gist Lauren Edelman has documented, many employers adopt practic-
es based on management consultants’ claims that the recommended 
practices would render organizations free from legal liability, even 
when such claims are not rooted in any established case law.225 In turn, 
some evidence suggests that courts will incorporate these organiza-
tional efforts into legal standards for compliance, thus creating a syn-
ergistic feedback loop.226 So EEOC attention and guidelines might 
create a reinforcing regime to combat passive discrimination.  
Employers, or other actors in the workplace,227 might also be en-
couraged to combat firm segregation and discrimination more broadly. 
Existing organizational efforts to promote diversity include “imple-
mentation of organizational accountability by creating new positions 
or taskforces designed specifically to address diversity issues, mana-
gerial bias training, and mentoring and network practices.”228 Such 
processes could be expanded to include concern for how the existing 
organizational structure may not satisfy minority employee prefe-
rences even if it does not formally exclude them. Some empirical evi-
dence suggests programs designed to increase minority recruitment 
and employment have been successful,229 so reason exists to be hopeful 
about expanding the focus of these programs. 
                                                                                                                           
 224 Courts have not resolved the level of deference due the EEOC but often decide cases 
contrary to EEOC guidelines. See Melissa Hart, Skepticism and Expertise: The Supreme Court 
and the EEOC, 74 Fordham L Rev 1937, 1949–61 (2006). 
 225 Lauren B. Edelman, Overlapping Fields and Constructed Legalities: The Endogeneity of 
Law, in Justin O’Brien, ed, Private Equity, Corporate Governance, and the Dynamics of Capital 
Market Regulation 55, 70 (Imperial College 2007) (suggesting that lawyers and management 
consultants “emphasise and even exaggerate the threatening aspects of legal environments” in 
order to shield businesses from possible liability). 
 226 See Edelman, Uggen, and Erlanger, 105 Am J Sociology at 408 (cited in note 182). 
 227 Those employee institutions engaged in collective action, such as unions, might them-
selves be made aware of these problems and be encouraged to bargain over these particular terms 
and conditions of employment. In order for this strategy to work, these bargaining units need to be 
effective representatives of those individuals with protected characteristics. That being said, if 
passive discrimination keeps these individuals from disfavored groups out of particular workplaces, 
then organization of existing employees may be unlikely to focus on these issues. 
 228 Pager and Shepherd, 34 Ann Rev Sociology at 195 (cited in note 43). As evidence indi-
cates that poorly designed programs can create new or reinforce old stereotypes as well as in-
crease hostility between employees, it is important to be mindful of the limitations of diversity 
training. See Bisom-Rapp, 22 Berkeley J Empl & Labor L at 38–44 (cited in note 223). 
 229 See Harry J. Holzer and David Neumark, What Does Affirmative Action Do?, 53 Indus 
Labor Rel Rev 240, 269 (2000) (investigating how extensive recruiting, intensive screening, and 
on-the-job training contribute to the success of workplace affirmative action policies in hiring 
more minorities and women). 
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2. Incentivizing employer restructuring.  
In addition to mandating changes in employer behavior and edu-
cating employers, legislators and the EEOC can also incentivize vo-
luntary changes in employer practices. While the EEOC’s primary 
task is to investigate, conciliate, and litigate, the EEOC also possesses 
the authority to undertake initiatives to combat employment discrim-
ination. For example, the EEOC recently designed a “freedom to 
compete” program, characterized as an “outreach, education, and coa-
lition-building strategy designed to complement the agency’s en-
forcement and litigation programs.”230 In addition, the EEOC currently 
crafts reports outlining what it considers to be best practices to eradi-
cate discrimination.231 Such tools might also be used to combat these 
subtle compensation terms-and-conditions issues.232 The EEOC could 
also incentivize creative solutions and reward those companies that 
develop and embody the gold standard approach.233  
For most of the problems identified in this Article, figuring out ways 
to enhance employee choice should help reduce benefits discrimination 
for those with atypical preferences. Ideally, such choice also creates a sec-
ondary beneficial effect on workplace segregation by decreasing the 
number of members of protected classes who voluntarily opt out of 
firms with undesirable packages and structures. Such organizational 
adjustment may contribute to long-term stability by increasing the fair-
ness of compensation and other terms and conditions of employment.234 
While federal tax law encourages employers to give all workers with 
the same experience the same fringe benefits package, employers can still 
                                                                                                                           
 230 EEOC, Facts about the Freedom to Compete Initiative, online at http://www.eeoc.gov/ 
initiatives/compete/index.html (visited Apr 14, 2009).  
 231 See, for example, EEOC, Interim Report on Best Practices for the Employment of People 
with Disabilities in State Government (Oct 29, 2004), online at http://www.eeoc.gov/initiatives/ 
nfi/int_states_best_practices_report.html (visited Apr 14, 2009) (finding that a number of states 
have established hiring and training programs specifically for individuals with disabilities and 
that adequate procedures exist to handle requests for reasonable accommodations). 
 232 David Charny and G. Mitu Gulati have suggested the EEOC provide rewards to workplaces 
that study and restructure their workplaces to eradicate bias in subjective decisionmaking and  
the effects of certain groups choosing self-defeating strategies. Such a program should be legally 
viable (race- or gender-neutral) as long as it is framed in terms of ensuring an equal opportunity 
workplace; incentives for adopting such programs could come from both economic advantages 
and from the pressures exerted by a reconstructed employment discrimination doctrine. 
David Charny and G. Mitu Gulati, Efficiency-wages, Tournaments, and Discrimination: A Theory of 
Employment Discrimination Law for “High-level” Jobs, 33 Harv CR–CL L Rev 57, 105 (1998). 
 233 Nancy Levit, Megacases, Diversity, and the Elusive Goal of Workplace Reform, 49 BC L 
Rev 367, 404 (2008) (discussing diversity programs that have purposes and effects beyond reduc-
ing and ending litigation). 
 234 See Faye Crosby, The Denial of Personal Discrimination, 27 Am Behavioral Scientist 
371, 382 (1984). 
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maximize their tax benefits and allow employee choice within packages. 
For example, the federal government currently offers its employees the 
choice of multiple health plans235 rather than limiting them to one, as is 
often the case in the private sector. Such choice allows employees to 
select a package that best matches their expectations and preferences.236 
One can imagine similar options for pension benefits in which employees 
could elect how much pay to take directly as wages and how much to 
backload through pension benefits.237 Rather than the status quo in 
which employers often automatically enroll employees through defined 
benefit plans, the EEOC could encourage employers to allow workers 
to decide whether and how much to invest in defined contribution 
plans.238 Employers could allow employees to decide how to distribute 
their matching contributions, which could include benefits such as 
health insurance.  
Analogous compensation menus might be offered for positions 
that currently rely on commission sales. The EEOC could encourage 
employers to offer a variety of wage packages in sales jobs that allow 
individuals to assess their desired level of risk-taking in determining the 
composition of their salaries. While the businesses may seek to incentiv-
ize sales through a commission,239 creative employers might find non-
                                                                                                                           
 235 See Cynthia Dailard, State Contraceptive Coverage Laws: Creative Responses to Ques-
tions of Conscience, 2 Guttmacher Rep Pub Policy 4, 1 (1999), online at http://www.guttmacher. 
org/pubs/tgr/02/4/gr020401.pdf (visited Apr 14, 2009) (noting the 285 plans available in the Fed-
eral Employees Health Benefits Program). In practice, however, employees are often limited by 
geography to a few choices. See Federal Employees Health Benefit Plan Information for 2008, 
online at http://www.opm.gov/insure/08/planinfo.asp (visited Apr 14, 2009) (providing informa-
tion on the plans available in each of the fifty states). 
 236 In order for such choice to work, insurance packages need to be more transparent. See 
Sylvia A. Law, Sex Discrimination and Insurance for Contraception, 73 Wash L Rev 363, 386 n 132 
(1998) (detailing the difficulties employers and employees face in ascertaining what medical 
services are covered by their health insurance providers). Both employers and employees need 
to be able to easily ascertain whether such packages cover services and prescriptions most likely 
to be utilized by protected classes such as prescription contraceptives or sickle cell–related pro-
cedures. Perhaps EEOC training of human resources and benefits personnel could help firms 
achieve this transparency.  
 237 This may create problems for other protected groups. While African-Americans may 
rationally opt out of pension benefits, Hispanics, who traditionally have longer life expectancies, 
are the most likely to opt out of pensions. See Dorothy A. Brown, Pensions, Risk, and Race, 61 
Wash & Lee L Rev 1501, 1530 (2004) (analyzing the racial differences between workers who 
receive pension benefits, and finding that whites are the most likely to be covered by pensions, 
while Hispanics are the least likely to be covered).  
 238 See GAO, Pension Plans: Characteristics of Persons in the Labor Force without Pension 
Coverage 7 n 6 (Aug 2000), online at http://www.gao.gov/archive/2000/he00131.pdf (visited Apr 
14, 2009) (“While defined benefit plans generally enroll qualified employees automatically, 
defined contribution plans, such as 401(k) plans, are generally voluntary and employees must 
choose to participate in them.”). 
 239 For purposes of the model and the hypotheticals, we assume that all workers are equally 
productive regardless of compensation offered. If commission-based sales actually track produc-
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compensation measures to encourage the same high level of sales. For 
instance, Sears adjusted the level of salary dependent on commission 
when it decided it wanted to attract more female employees.240 Rather 
than eliminate commission-based jobs or offer all employees the same 
commission, Sears could have provided multiple options. 
Employee choice could also address the problems raised by “Sun-
days off” policies. If Chick-fil-A is serious about its desire to provide “a 
day off to spend with family and friends,”241 then perhaps franchisees or 
employees should have some discretion over which day that will be. 
While religious employees of non-Sunday faiths can already seek ac-
commodation under Title VII, Sundays need not be the default day off 
for all employees if Chick-fil-A does not seek to send a religious message.  
Of course, employee choice raises several concerns.242 First, for 
employee choice to work, such choices must be perceived as valid 
choices. Successfully providing a menu requires that employers not 
stigmatize some of the options—as some suggest has happened under 
so-called “mommy tracks.”243 Such practices might be less likely as 
                                                                                                                           
tivity, then the question of whether employers should be encouraged to abandon the practice is 
outside the scope of this Article. At least some evidence, though, suggests preference for salary-
based risk is unrelated to productivity or skill. See note 68. 
 240 See note 70. 
 241 Chick-fil-A, Frequently Asked Questions, online at http://www.chick-fil-a.com/Work.asp 
(visited Apr 14, 2009). 
 242 The three authors disagree about the viability of such an approach. One major concern 
is the possibility that employees may choose poorly in attempting to satisfy their preferences. For 
instance, most workers elect not to participate in their pension plans, which might make sense for 
some black workers but makes little sense for Hispanics, who have the highest life expectancy. 
See Dorothy A. Brown, 61 Wash & Lee L Rev at 1521 (cited in note 237). If we are right about 
the effectiveness of screening mechanisms, many individuals already have an accurate sense of 
their preferences, which should, but may not, align with their actual needs. 
A very different approach would be to decrease employers’ incentives to provide fringe 
benefits. As the tax code is currently structured, it encourages employers to provide compensa-
tion in the form of fringe benefits. Neither they nor the employee pays taxes on such benefits, 
though the employees would pay taxes if they procured such services on the open market. If 
reducing either workplace segregation or equalizing the perceived value of compensation re-
ceived is the primary goal, the government could stop subsidizing these benefits. Yet such an 
outcome seems unpalatable. As explained earlier in the Article, it lowers the economic value of 
compensation to Deltas without a corresponding rise in economic value to Omegas. If all we care 
about is equality in perceived compensation or decreasing workplace segregation, then this is 
unobjectionable. But one of the currently extolled virtues of employers is that they choose to 
provide these services particularly when they get a good deal for employees. 
One could then further combine an elimination of the tax incentives with government provi-
sion of many of these services. The government could provide greater amounts of health care 
and social services to alleviate the burden on the employer. Even then, though, employers could 
try to offer greater benefits to achieve the same sorting function. A truly socialized system might 
eliminate this possibility, but, of course, the costs and benefits of such an approach raise a much 
larger debate than can be adequately addressed in this Article. 
 243 See, for example, Amy L. Wax, Family-friendly Workplace Reform: Prospects for Change, 
596 Annals Am Acad Polit & Soc Sci 36, 37 (2004) (observing how mommy tracks have devalued 
employees who choose fewer hours); Joan Williams, Exploring the Economic Meanings of Gend-
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most of the forms of passive discrimination we identify would not in-
volve the employee opting into less hours for less pay but into the 
same hours for differently structured pay.  
Second, facilitating choice poses significant administrative costs for 
small and sometimes even large employers. Rather than providing one 
benefits package and one compensation structure, benefits and payroll 
personnel and structures must accommodate a variety of options. As 
increasing numbers of employers seek to provide choice with attention 
to previously unnoticed discrimination, health and pension benefit mar-
ket niches may develop. Even then, many, though not all, fringe benefits 
rely on pooling. For instance, in order for employers to get good deals on 
group health and life insurance, insurance providers often require that 
they put all the employees on the same group policy. Otherwise, if those 
who believe themselves least likely to draw on the insurance opt out, in-
surance companies are unlikely to offer employers the same discounts. 
CONCLUSION 
By naming, describing, and modeling a rarely discussed mechanism 
of employment discrimination, this Article adds to the literature on sub-
tle forms of discrimination and the causes of workplace segregation. By 
way of example, we examine the employment law context to show that 
legislators and courts failed to draft and interpret Title VII with such 
problems in mind. Both intentional and unintentional passive discrimina-
tion can lead to segregated workplaces, but as currently conceived, doc-
trinal and practical problems may foreclose Title VII as an effective de-
terrent or remedy. As a first step, we note a number of changes that might 
be made to Title VII or to legislation more generally to address particular 
mechanisms of passive discrimination in terms and conditions of em-
ployment. As scholars across disciplines have noted, reformers may need 
to conceptualize major changes in order to address these problems of 
segregation and structural discrimination. These problems, which we hy-
pothesize in perfectly competitive markets with idealized workers, may 
be exacerbated if we relax some of the assumptions of our model, such as 
the notion of equally productive workers. While we introduce passive 
discrimination in the context of race, sex, national origin, and religion, we 
hope to pursue future scholarship to address how the deployment of such 
                                                                                                                           
er, 49 Am U L Rev 987, 995 (2000) (arguing that the work of employees in flex-time and part-
time positions are generally marginalized relative to the work of other employees). But see Mary 
Anne Case, How High the Apple Pie?: A Few Troubling Questions about Where, Why, and How 
the Burden of Care for Children Should Be Shifted, 76 Chi-Kent L Rev 1753, 1768 (2001) (sug-
gesting employers are successfully choosing to reduce the stigma of so-called mommy tracks and 
recasting them as “life outside of work” options), quoting Sue Schellenbarger, Work & Family: 
Shedding Light on Women’s Records Dispels Stereotypes, Wall St J B1 (Dec 20, 1995). 
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mechanisms affect other categories including family status, sexual orien-
tation, and disability. 
